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Foreword

I

am delighted to introduce this important and timely pap er

written by

a

scholar with distinguished credentials and strong connections to the military
and the Naval War College. Dr. Nordquist holds a doctorate in juridical science
from the University of Virginia and earned a diploma in international law at
Cambrid ge where he atten ded Grey's Inn of Court. After active duty in the
,

us. Marines, including service in Vietnam, he joined the State D e partmen t as
an attorney and legislative counsel. Leaving government service for several years

of private practice, he later returned to become Deputy General Counsel of
the US. Air Force, s e r ving as A c tin g General Counsel for six months in 1993.
Since August of that year he has been a professor oflaw at the US. Air Force
Academy. In 1995-96 he was the Charles H. Stockton Professor ofInternational
Law at the Naval War College. It was in that academic year that he produced
this Newpor t Paper.
Dr. Nordquist's study reviews past pea cek eeping oper ation s and th e aspects

of the Charter of the United Nations that govern the use of force. He proposes
that. given the end of the Cold War, distinctions in the UN Charter framework

between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions can and ought to be
refl ec t ed in future Security Co uncil peaceke eping mandates. He also offers

realistic peace-enforcement scenarios illustrating how upd ated mandates might
operate.
This overview of the Charter and the challenges of modern peace operations
provides a better und e rstan di ng of the legal and inst itut ion al nature of the

Security Council. of why existing peacekeeping mandates nowlack co nsistency,
and of the importance of dealing with these issues.
Dr. Nordquist's work exemplifies the purposes of our Newport Papers
senes-it is current, insightful and rel evan t I commend it to those policy makers
.

who will shape the peace operations of the future as well as the milit ary
commanders and their staffs who wil l carry them out

.

Rear Admiral, US. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Introduction

This study is divided into five chapters. The first focuses on the legal
framework for peacekeeping and enforcement operations under the United
Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. The general approach here is
an article-by -article review of the pertinent texts, without delving into nuances
of meaning or legislative history. An occasional prescriptive comment will be
made in relevant context, but by and large the fundamental idea is that an
overview of the Charter's pr inciples and rules will facilitate a better under
standing of the legal and institutional framework in which the Security Council
issues peacekeeping mandates. As will be shown, much of the confusion over
current peacekeeping practice lies in inadequately considered departures from
what States actually agreed to do in the United Nations and Nato. Chapter II
is a br ief summary of the forty peacekeeping operations in which the United
Nations engaged from June 1948 through the end of 1995. Again, to foster a
reform-minded policy outlook, only a skeletal descr iption of the mandate for
each UN peacekeeping operation is given. Marshaling such an outline of
peacekeeping operations is instructive in that even the bare recitation of this
fifty years of practice reveals a remarkable range of exper iences. It is easy to
discer n why Security Council mandates on peacekeeping lack consistency.
Chapter III of this study contains an analysis of UN peacekeeping practice and
of key points that ought to be dealt with in reformulating traditional peacekeep
ing and enforcement actions under Security Council mandates. In Chapter IV,
several scenarios are presented to illustrate how properly mandated peacekeep
ing and enforcement operations might work in the post-Cold War era. To
emphasize the critical distinctions between different use of force mandates and
the cor responding legal status of the individuals involved, the illustrations refer
to white, blue, and green helmet participants. Chapter V of this study proposes
a few suggestions to improve Security Council mandates for "mixed" traditional
peacekeeping and enforcement actions.
A threshold comment is needed for clarification about the use of the term
"peacekeeping" in this study W hen the term appears alone, it refers to the great
variety of activities that have been mandated and therefore formally designated
as "peacekeeping" operations. As will be explained, peacekeeping is a generic
label that, inter alia, obscures an important legal distinction between traditional
peacekeeping and enforcement actions. Fuzzy definitions can be useful for
shorthand communication, but they can also contribute to fuzzy thinking. From
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a legal perspective, it is important to know what is meant by the term
"peacekeeping." However, efforts to use more precise words with better defined
meanings may also pose problems. For instance, the term "peace enforcement"
is now heard and often seen in the literature. While this is an understandable
effort to distinguish operations based on consent from those that are not, the
term is not taken from the Charter, is ill-defmed in actual practice, and is logically
inconsistent as a phrase. The approach prefer red in this study is to use words
taken from the text of the Charter or with an agreed meaning in State practice.
However, bowing to overwhelming usage, an exception to this preference for
precise language is made in the case of the term "peacekeeping." Accordingly,
the ter m is used in this study generically to cover the entire spectrum of activities
ranging from traditional peacekeeping to enforcement actions. Finally, a cut-off
date is necessary for publication purposes. Unless otherwise indicated, the date
used for this study is 31 December 1 995 .

I
UN Charter and North Atlantic Treaty
�HE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS entered into force on 24
Jl October 1945. Amendments to Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter were
adopted by the General Assembly and came into force on 31 August 1965. The
only other Charter amendments-to Article 61 (enlarging the Economic and
Social Council) and to Article 109 (relating to a review of the Charter)-are
not germane to this study
The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security
Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions
of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of nin e Members (formerly seven). Decisions of the Security Council on

all other matters require an afErmative vote of nine Members, including the

concurring votes (which may be abstentions) of the five Permanent Members.

Chapter I of the Charter consists of two articles outlining the purposes of

the United Nations. Article 1 (1) reads: "To maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace.... " Paragraph 21ists developing friendly relations

among nations based on, inter alia, self-determination of peoples, while para
graph 4 identifies the United Nations as a center for harmonizing the actions
of nations in the attainment of these ends.
A threshold point is that the United Nations is a compact between sovereign
States that agree to take collective action to attain international peace and
security. There is no residual clause that places unallocated power in the hands
of "the people" as does Amendment X of the U.S. Constitution. Agreement

The Newport Papers
bet ween sovereign States is the legal glue of the UN Charter. That is all there
is; and absent agreement, there is no legal basis for action. It follows that the
rules regarding what States mayor maynot do ultimately must be found within

the text of the UN Charter that embodies their agreement.Subsequent practice

that is consistent with the r ights and obligations expressed in the Charter may
be accepted by States as part of the Charter legal regime. But if binding legal
obligations are inferred from State practice, such acts of acceptance must be
unmistakable. Implied legal obligations are not lightly imposed on sovereign
States. Their agreement to be bound must be real, and this is usually clearer
where expressed in writing, e.g., in treaties rather than inferred from State
practice, e.g., customar y law.
Article 2 reflects the fundamental premise that sovereign States are the

building blocks of the UN Charter byproviding that the Organization is "based

on the pr inciple of the sovereign equality of all its Members." The heart of the
Charter is found in Article 2(4) that requires Members to refrain from the threat
or use of force against the territor ial integrityor political independence of any
State. Paragraph 7 of Article 2 is especiallygermane for peacekeeping operations
in that it prohibits the United Nations from inter vening in "matters which
are essentially within the domestic jur isdiction of any state .... " The fact
that the Secur i t y Council declares a particular situation, as it did in the 1993
peacekeeping inter vention in Haiti, to be a "threat to inter national peace and
security" mayor may not satisfY all Charter legal requirements. This issue is of
importance to future Security Council mandates regarding peacekeeping and

will be discussed later in this study. At this stage, note that a Security Council

mandate may meet the procedural, but not the substantive, requirements of the
Charter. Article 2(7) finishes byprov iding that "this pr inciple shall not prejudice

the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

The distinction between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions is a
critical part of this study. Traditional peacekeeping activities are based on consent.
Enforcement measures, including enforcement actions, bycontrast, are the opposite;
that is, theyare nonconsensual or coercive in nature. The Secretariat of the United
Nations as an institution is not well-constituted, either legally or practically
, to
engage in the coercive use of military force. This is evidenced bythe fact that the
Secretary-General and his staff are international civil servants, not military profes
sionals. It is recognized in Article 2(7) of the Charter that it may be necessary to
intervene in the domestic affairs of a State to carry out enforcement measures
authorized bythe Security Council. Such intervention is an agreed upon role for
sovereign States, acting collectively, to undertake as provided in the Charter.

However, as we shall see, peacekeeping practice evolved to fill a gap left in the
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Charter between peaceful resolution of disputes and collective enforcement

measures. It was practice , not Charter mandate, that revealed the need for UN

forces to play a neutral, third-party military role. Indeed, this role for the
Secretariat was not anticipated at all in the Charter.
The principal problem with the way the Charter was written with respect
to security and use of force issues was that the Permanent Members of the
Security Council did not cooperate as fully as expected due to the Cold War.
With the breakup of the Soviet bloc, the question now is whether the United
Nations can function, more or less, as originally expected. The thesis developed
in this study is that, while perfection is impossible, the letter and spirit of the

UN Charter now can, and should, be followed more faithfully in peacekeeping
activities. The Secretary-General ought to remain in charge of traditional
peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the Secretary-General should not
have "command and control" of operations to implement military enforcement
measures. The Security Council should, instead, mandate enforcement action
leadership either to an appropriate Chapter

VIIJ regional collective security

organization or to a Chapter VII coalition co mmand constituted for the purpose

by contributing Members. In mixed "war-peace" peacekeeping operations,

whatever enforcement entity is mandated must, as a practical matter , cooperate

closely with the Secretary-General, who is the leader of traditional peacekeeping
efforts. But enforcement entities should report directly to the Security Council
and future Security Council mandates should be crystal clear on this point.
Equally, the Secretary-General and his staff should never be mandated to engage

in enforcement. His proper and legal role is to "keep peace," not to "wage war."
In Chapter II of the Charter, Members are defined as "states," and Article 5

provides for the suspension of membership for States against whom preventive
or enforcement action has been authorized by the Security Council. Chapter
1II establishes, inter alia, the General Assembly, Security

Council, and Secretariat

as principal organs of the United Nations. This chapter also authorizes the

establishment of necessary UN subsidiary organs.
Chapter

IV describes the functions and powers of the General Assembly. Any

matter may be discussed in the General Assembly, including inter national peace

and security. Except as provided in Article 12, it may make recommendations

to Members or to the Security Council. But questions on what action is

necessary must be referred to the Security Council. Article 12 provides that,
while the Security Council is exercising its functions with regard to any dispute
or situation, the General Assembly shall make no recommendation with regard
to that dispute or situation unless requested by the Security Council. Otherwise,

the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment
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of any situation. This chapter also empowers the General Assembly to apportion
the expenses to be borne by Members.

Article 18 grants each Member of the General Assembly one vote . Decisions

on "important" questions are to be made by a two-thirds majority. Such
questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of inter
national peace and security.
Chapter V lays out the composition, powers, and functions of the Security
Council. China, France, Russia , the United Kingdom, and the United States are
the five Permanent Members. The General Assembly elects ten other members
for two-year terms. Under Article 24, the Security Council is given the
"primary" responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secur ity.
Members specifically agree that the Security Council acts on their behalf in
carrying out its duties. Moreover, Members expressly agree, in Article 25, to
accept and carry out Security Council decisions. This latter undertaking is a
binding legal duty by all Members to obey properly rendered decisions of the
Secur ity Council.
Each Member of the Security Council has one vote. Decisions on procedural

matters require an affir mative vote of nine Members. All other matters, i.e.,

substantive matters, require an affirmative vote of nine Members, including the
concurring votes of the Permanent Members. In this regard, the long-standing
practice of the United Nations is that an abstention by a Per manent Member
does not constitute a veto. The Security Council may invite Members (or even
non-Members) who are not on the Security Council to participate, without
voting, in discussions of their disputes or where their interests are specially
affected.
Chapter VI is titled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." So-called Article 33
disputes are those "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security." Parties to these disputes are first to resort to peaceful means of
their own choice. The Security Council may investigate to determine whether
the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance
of inter national peace and secur ity. Article 35 empowers any Member to bring
any such dispute or situation to the attention of the Security Council or the
General Assembly. Article 36 provides that the Secur ity Council may recom
mend appropr iate procedures or methods to the parties whereby peaceful
settlement of Article 33 disputes may be achieved. The thrust of Chapter VI is
for voluntary resolution of disputes by the parties. The parties are obligated, in
the event that the hoped-for peaceful means are unsuccessful, to refer the dispute
to the Security Council. The Security Council may recommend actual terms
of settlement in such cases, especially when requested by the parties.
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If the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace,
hreach of the peace, or act of aggression, it may take actions in accordance with
Chapter VII to maintain or restore international peace and secur ity. To prevent
aggravation of the situation, Article 40 empowers the Security Council to call
upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it
deems necessary or desirable. The Security Council may next decide, under
Article 41, on measures by Members that do not involve the use of armed force.
These may include interruption of economic relations and means of commu
nication or the severance of diplomatic relations. If the Security Co uncil fmds
Article 41 measures inadequate, it may authorize an escalation, pursuant to
Article 42, to such "action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 42 actions may
include blockade and other military operations by Members' forces. Note here
that the Charter mentions only "Members' forces" in connection with Chapter
VII enforcement measures. There is no runt here or, for that matter, any where in

the Charter of standby military forces to serve under the command of the
Secretary-General. Instead, Article 43 imposes an affirmative obligation on
Members to contribute armed forces, assistance, and facilities at the call of the
Security Council. According to the Charter text, these contr ibutions were
supposed to be made available in accordance with special agreements entered
into for this purpose. The agreements were to cover the number and type of
forces, readiness, and location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance. The
agreements between the Secur ity Council and Members, or groups ofMembers,
were to be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes. As of this wr iting, no such agreements
have been concluded as envisioned in the Charter.
Article 45 contemplates Members holding "immediately available national
air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action." Plans to use
armed force under UN authorization were to be made with the assistance of the
Military Staff Committee. Pursuant to Article 47, the Military Staff Committee is
made up exclusively of representatives from the five Permanent Members. Its stated
purpose in the Charter is "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions
relating to the Security Council's military requirements.... " In that capacity, the
Military Staff Committee is supposed to be responsible for the strategic direction
of any armed forces acting under the Security Council. In fact, the Military Staff
Committee has never functioned as intended. Permanent Five representatives to
the Committee do meet regularly at UN Headquarters, but meetings are
perfunctory and substantively meaningless.
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Article 48 specifically requires all Members to carry out the actions decided
by the Security Council under Chapter VII. These actions may be done directly
or, going beyond the more general obligations contained in Article 25, through
international agencies of which they are members. The obligatory nature of

Article 48 with respect to enforcement actions makes this provision one of the

most legally significant provisions in the Charter . For example, Member States
are obligated to pursue policies in the World Bank that are consistent with
Security Council decisions with respect to States against whom Security
Council enforcement actions are under way.
But the most important principle pertaining to the use of force in the UN
Charter is found in Article 51, the last article in Chapter VII. The first sentence
of Article 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent ri gh t of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces
sary to maintain international peace and security.

Members are still obliged to inform the Security Council immediately of

the measures they exercise in their self-defense. And, the use of Article 51

self-defense measures do es not relieve the Security Council of its obligations
to take necessary actions to maintain or restore international peace and secur ity.
Experts debate whether Article 51 creates an independent right of self-defense
or simply recognizes that such a right exists under customary law. Perhaps it
does both, although each legal theory carries different legal nuances. The text
in the Charter imposes a condition precedent of an "armed attack" (at least in
the English translation) and a condition subsequent of "until" the Security
Council acts, presumably in an effective manner. These specific limitations do not
exist in pre-Charter customary international law. In fact, the view that custom

ary law rights (and duties) of self-defense coexist with Article 51 gives expanded
scope to use of force by States. W hile the temptation is great to delve more into
the debate about what is the true meaning of self-defense, this urge must be
resisted due to the scope of this study. The reader is referred, instead, to other
sources that are fo cused solely on the topic of self-defense and Article 51.1

Birth of

Peacekeeping

The ChapterVII enforcement measures provided in Articles 41 and 42 are
the backbone of the Charter's collective security system. The underlying premise

6

What Color Helmet?
in this system is that the five Permanent Members in the Security Council can
agree sufficiently on the use of ar med force that none consistently vetoes
required actions. A correlative premise is that the Security Council may not
mandate enforcement actions affirmatively opposed by any one of the Perma
nent Five. Frequently, on peacekeeping votes, a Permanent Member expresses
neutrality in the form of an abstention. As noted above, the time-honored
practice of the Security Council is that an abstention is not a veto. Nevertheless,
consistent lack of enthusiasm, as has been the case with China, should not be
dismissed as an insignificant political attitude. Any Member of the Permanent
Five is capable of cr ippling the Security Council's effectiveness. That is the
safeguard that Member States wanted, and therefore so provided in the Charter,
prior to the United Nation's taking affirmative action on international peace
and security matters. This hard-core political reality provides the central legal
and institutional framework within which peacekeeping mandates must be
formulated. At the same time, while the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Five
also make up the Military Staff Committee that was to plan Security Council
military activities under the Charter, there is no indication that peacekeeping
planning will be entrusted to that committee. And, of course, there is no legal
obligation on the part of the Security Council to use the Military Staff
Committee as originally planned.
The cooperation of the Permanent Five after World War II, which permitted
the founding of the United Nations, dissipated shortly after the Charter entered
into force. The Cold War ensued with the Soviet Union and its Easter n Bloc
allies on one side and with the United States, France, and Great Br itain and
their allies on the other. The Republic of China government soon no longer
exercised sovereignty over the ter ritory of mainland China, and China's seat on
the Security Council was eventually taken in the mid-1970s by a communist
regime. This further handicapped cooperation among the Permanent Five and
effective functioning of their Military Staff. The result was to cripple the
collective security arrangements envisioned in the Charter.
At the same time, new conflicts arose that commanded the attention of the
United Nations. In particular, the process of decolonization unleashed ethnic
strife and destabilized various regions. W here armed crises developed, Members
of the United Nations felt pressured into finding ways to contain hostilities and
to control conflicts outside the legal parameters expressly provided within the
four corners of the Charter text.
As peacekeeping operations were not anticipated by the Charter draftsmen,
no descr iption of the practices is given in Charter text. At first, the Security
Council formulated mandates tailored to the particular circumstances of each
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crisis, and peacekeeping practice "just grew," case by case, over a per iod of
time. The characteristics of a peacekeeping doctrine therefore emerged
gradually as the United Nations responded to various conflict situation s in
which the international community expected it to act in the interests of
world peace. Most frequently, a peacekeeping ac tivity was a UN operation
using military personnel, not in

a

fighting or enforcement role but rather in

an obser ver or "buffer" role. The peacekeeping forces der ived their legiti

macy from the fact that the contending State parties wanted them in their
sovereign territory and expressly agreed to their presence. They di d not
expect to fight in the first instance.
Since the peacekeeper s were in the host State with the consent of the
contending parties, including the host government recognized by the United
Nations, the host Member

nation was expected to cooperate with the

peacekeeping efforts. The peacekeeper s were, accordingly, lightly armed and, in
principle, were to engage only in their individual or unit self-defense. Use of
force was clearly a last resort. Most importantly, these UN "blue helmets" were
neutrals with orders to act impartially. The core idea was that the traditional
peacekeepers were invited guests of the recognized government and were
expected to achieve peacekeeping objectives more by moral authority than by
force of arms. It was understood by all that UN forces would act in self-defense,
in the personal protection sense, when resort to the use of armed force was
truly unavoidable. But the real role of the traditional peacekeeper was keeping
peace between consenting nations, not taking enforcement actions against
unwilling parties.
The term "peacekeeping" initially may have come into general use around

1956 when the United Nations created a "Special Committee on Peace-keeping
Operations." Typically, these peacekeeping operations involved supervision and
maintenance of cease-fires, assistance in troop withdrawals, and provision of
buffer zones between opposing forces. The legal mandate was always to maintain
or restore international peace and security. The operations were also conducted
in a political climate where the primary responsibility for success or failure lay
with civilian personnel.
A point to note at this stage is that the traditional peacekeeping doctrine that
evol ved through ad hoc practice was less peaceful than was envisioned in Chapter
VI and less forceful than the doctrine that was contemplated

in Chapter VII of

the Charter. This led to the oft-cited observati on of the late Secretary-General
Dag Hammarskjold that these kinds of traditional peacekeeping activities were
author ized under a nonexistent Chapter "six and one-half" of the UN Charter.
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North Atlantic Treaty
The importa nt role to be played by regional organizations in the maintenance
of internation al peace and security is primarily recognized in Chapter VIII of
the Charter. Article 52 provides that regional arrangements may deal with peace
and secur ity issues "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations." Indeed, paragraph 2 of Article 52 requires Members in such agencies
to "make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement oflocal disputes through
such regional arrangements ... before referring them to the Security Council."
In turn, the Secur ity Council is to encourage pacific settlement of local disputes
through such regional arrangements. In essence, the secur ity sy stem in the
Charter is predicated upon action by a regional organization prior to the stage
when the United Nations, as a global entity, must become involved.
Article 53 provides that the Security Council may utilize regional arrange
ments for enforcement action taken under its authority. At the same time, this
Chapter VIII article is quite specific in prohibiting enforcement acti on by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. A collateral
note here is that there is no Charter prohibition to preclude Nato as a legal
entity from being itself a party to a Charter VIII collective security arrangement.
Indeed, this possibility could be a key for a new collective security alliance in
Europe. Lastly, Article 54 requires that the Security Council be kept fully
informed about the international peace and security activities of regional
agencIes.
The North Atlantic Treaty that charters Nato entered into force on 24 August

1949. The parties to this agreement are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ic eland Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
,

Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The North Atlantic Treaty text begins with a: reaffirmation of the UN Charter.
Th e Parti es express a resolve to "unite their efforts for collective defense and
for the preservation of peace and security." In Artic le 1, the Parties pledge
themselves to the peaceful settl ement of disputes and to refr ain "from the threat
or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations." Article 2 de a ls w ith economic collaborati on and stability. Article 3
provides that the Parties "will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack." By Article 4, the Parties agree to
consult when the "territor ial integrity, political independence or security of
any of the Parties is threaten ed." Article 5, the heart of the commitment in the
Nato alliance, reads in its entirety as follows:
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The Parties agree that

an

armed attack against one or more of them in

Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all;
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with

the

other Parties, such action

as

it deems necessary, including

the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the securit y of the North
Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and

all measures taken

as a

result thereof are to be

immediately reported to the Security Council. Such

measures shall be

terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6 defines an Article 5 a r med attack to include an ar med attack on
the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America or on the vessels
or a i rc r aft in this area

.

Article 7 provides that the Treaty does not affect the Members' rights and
obligations under the UN Charter or the primary responsibility of the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 9
establishes the Nato Council, and the remainder of the articles are largely

procedural.
T he collective response contemplated in the North Atlantic Treaty is predi
cated on an armed atta ck against a Par t y s ter r i to ry in Europe or North America.
'

But, as noted at the beginning of this heading, enforcement throu gh the regional
arrangement scheme provided in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is subordinate
to the Security Council where any Permanent Five Member can veto action.
Clearly, however, the Western Powers that formed Nato did not want to be
under the control of an organ in which the Soviet Union held a decisive veto.
The purpose of Nato was to defend against the Soviet bloc, and the North
Atlantic Treaty understandably makes no mention of any relationship to the
Security Council as a

"

regional arrangement" under Chapter VIII. Nato is set

up to use armed force without Security Council author ization, and there is no
requirement that the alliance take military enforcement action only after
receiving authorization from the Security Council. Instead, the North Atlantic
Treaty is expressly founded on the "collective self-defense" theory in Article

51 of the UN Charter. Consistent with that, the Treaty simply requires
immediate reporting to the Security Council of" all measures taken" in response
to an armed attack.
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No defmition of "regional ar rangement" is given in the UN Charter, and
experts have not always agreed on Nato's status in this regard. Nothing in the

UN Charter itself precludes Nato from assisting the Security Council in

enforcement actions. At the same time, such a role for Nato was not envisioned
in the North Atlantic Treaty.
As a matter of international law, a fundamental difference exists bet ween a
regional organization founded on t he pr in ciple of self-defense in Article
51 and one founded on the collective security princi ples in Article 53. The latter
entity is expressly prohibited from taking enforcement actions "without the
authorization ofthe Security CounciL ... "From a US. domestic law standpoint,

the difference is also legally significant. The US. Senate did not give its "advice

and consent," as required by the US. Constitution, to a North Atlantic Treaty

whereby N ato w as to p erform collective security duties u nder Security Council
direction. Nato was to defend against armed attacks against the Parties' territory,
aircraft, or vessels in North America or Europe. This agreement was approved

by the US. Senate as an Article 51 self-defense o rgani za tio n under Chapter VII ,
not as an Article 53 collective security organization under Chapter VI II.

UN Secretariat and Military Staff Committee
Article 97 creates the UN Secretariat consisting of the Se cr et ary-Gener al and

such staff as the Organization may require. The Security Council recommends
a candidate for Secretary-General who is then appointed by the General

Assembly. The Secretary-General is expressly denoted in Article 97 as the c hief
administrative officer of the United Nations. Among other powers, the Secre
tary-General may bring matter s which threaten peace and secur ity to the

attention of the Security Council. Other articles emphasize that the first loyalty
of Secretariat employees is to the United Nations and layout other details.

As the Chief Administrative Officer of the United N ations , the Secretary

General has considerable latitude in determining the size of the staff needed to

fulfill the functions of the Secretariat. One possible reading of the lack of

limitations in Article 97 is that the Security Council, or even the General

Assembly, could authorize per manent UN Forces, a "standing army," to serve

under the command of the Sec retar y G eneral An argument can be made, for
-

.

example, that he already recruits secur ity forces to guard UN Headquarters. The
forces could be expanded to help "police the world." However, the power to

create and control the staff required by the Organization for its in t ern al security
is far different from the power to command troops for enforcement actions in
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the name of the United Nations. This idea of a UN Guard was carefully
2
considered and the concept rejected.
An objective reading of the Charter reveals virtually no support for the notion
that a leading role for the Secretary-General was planned regarding the use of
force. In truth, in Article 47, a large role for the Militar y Staff Committee was
contemplated in adv ising the Security Council on the use of UN armed forces.

The Committee was to consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Members
of the Security Council or their representatives. As such, the Military Staff
Committee was expected to be competent to give "strategic direction" to the
armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. In addition, to
obtain such forces, the Security Council was to conclude agreements to make
forces available upon its call.

An early effort was undertaken to have the Military Staff Committee provide

the strategic direction and other services outlined above, as provided in the
Charter. But once again, the lack of political consensus among the Permanent
3
Five Members caused these efforts to be abandoned in August 1948. The most
insurmountable problem was an inability to agree on the total size of the forces
and on the relative sizes of the contributions of the Per manent Five. A second
basic disagreement arose over the location of the forces pending their use by
the Security Council. The third disagreement concerned provision of assistance
and facilities, including rights of passage, for armed forces. Essentially, this
question revolved around the extent to which a Member would commit in
advance for the use of its ter ritory by the armed forces operating under the
Security Council. The fourth major disagreement was over the obligation in

Article 29 to provide full logistical support for the forces contributed. At their
core, all the disagreements arose from political distrust related to the East-West

rivalry.

The lack of support to make use of the Military Staff Committee, as provided

in the Charter, does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Secretary

General must, or even should, step in to play that role. Granted, the Security
Council needs more professional advice on military matters than it has at the

present. The creation of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the
subsequent establishment of the Peace-keeping Situation Centre in April 1993
were constructive steps in this regard. The Centre will improve the monitoring
and information exchange between UN Headquarters and peacekeeping

missions in the field. This should enhance the effectiveness of the United
Nations in traditional peacekeeping operations. But there are definite limits to
what to expect from UN officials as military planners in the enforcement arena.
For example, no major power is yet ready to entrust sensitive intelligence
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information either to UN civil servants or to the Military Staff Committee
composed of all Members of the Permanent Five. And, as establishment of the
Situation Centre illustrates, real-time information is indispensable to effective
military planning and operations. The point is that military planners assigned

to UN Headquarters, who must gear up for intense enforcement actions, face
not only formidable legal and institutional barriers but also inherent operational
constraints.

Uniting for Peace Resolution
On 25 June 1950, the United States informed the Secretary-General that
North Korean forces had invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea and
requested an immediate convening of the Security Council to consider the
situation. By coincidence, the Soviet Union was boycotting Security Council
meetings to protest the presence of the Republic of China in the permanent
seat designated for the representative of China. Nevertheless, the Council met
and the Secretary-General characterized the Korean situation as a "threat to
4
international peace .,, On 27 June, the Council adopted a resolution with a
determination that the North Korean armed attack constituted a breach of the
peace. The Council recommended that Members furnish assistance, under
Article

43, to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and

security. Subsequently, sixteen Members provided military assistance and, pur
suant to another resolution adopted on 7 July 1950, authorized a unified
command structure under United States leadership.
The Soviet representative ended his boycott of the Security Council in
August. By resuming his seat on the Council and regaining his nation's veto
power, further authorization for enforcement action by the Security Council
on the Korean issue was stopped. The General Assembly, faced with an obvious
threat to international peace and security caused by a classic unwarranted act
of aggression, stepped in to pass, on

3 November 1950, the "Resolution on

Uniting for Peace . 5 The General Assembly noted the failure of the Security
..

Council to discharge its duties, citing overuse of the veto and the non-imple
mentation of its Article

43 calJ to arms. Section A of the Resolution provided

"that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent
Members, fai ls to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security in any case w here there appears to be a threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly
shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of
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a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary,
to maintain or restore inter national peace and security."
The implicit legal rationale for the Uniting for Peace Resolution was that

the General Assembly may do by recommendation under Chapter IV what the
Secur ity Council may do by decision under Chapter VII. This is a fundamentally

flawed legal rationale. It is true that the Secur ity Council is given "primary"
and not "exclusive" responsibility in matter s affecting inter national peace and
secur ity. It is equally true that the General Assembly has a proper advisory role
on such matters as outlined in the Charter. But nowhere is it contemplated in
the Charter that the General Assembly may authorize enforcement actions on
behalf of the United Nations. As its very name implies, that role was entrusted
to the Security Council under the express language of the Charter. The General
Assembly may offer opinions on such matters, and may even urge Members
with recommendations; the Charter does not, however, constitute it as an action
body for dealing with international peace and security. Moreover, considering
that the Secur ity Council did initially authorize a collective response to North
Korea's aggression, the Korean War case provides a weak precedent for claiming
expansive enforcement action powers being exercised by the General Assembly.

A large role for the General Assembly in traditional peacekeeping is, of course,

an entirely different matter. W hen done properly, they are under taken with the
consent of the sovereign States impacted. Suffice to note here that, hopefully,
the General Assembly will never again have to ftIl a void caused by the
unwillingness of the Security Council to meet its enforcement action respon
sibilities under the Char ter.
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II
Peacekee ping Practice

A

s

N OTED AT THE OUTSET o f this study, the t e r m "peacekeeping" does

no t appear in the UN Charter, an d there is no universal agreement about

th e precise content of its doctrine. However, over time, certain characterist ics

of UN peacekeep ing operatio ns emerge d in practice. The m ost no table aspect
is that traditional peaceke eping op eratio ns were conducted with the agreement

or consent of the parties to the conflict . This was true wh ether the p eacekeeper s

were deployed under the direct command and control of the UN Secretary
General or under Member States operating with delegat e d authority from the
Secur ity Council. Military operations un dertaken by UN-authorized force s in
either case mi gh t have been , for example, to monitor and facilitate implemen 
tatio n o f an existing truce agreement i n supp ort o f diplomatic efforts t o reach
a polit ical settlem ent . In such an instance, the consent of the disputants is
important not only for the safety of the peacekeepers but also as positive
eviden c e that the contending part ies are sinc ere about concluding a last ing
peace. The contending parties typically must agree upon many details of the
deployment , including the nationality o f the tro ops in the peacekeeping military
forces.
Another key characteristic, in addition to host State agreement or warrin g

factions' consen t , is that the tradit ional peacekeeper was to main tain strict

impartiality. A fundamental Charter principle, clearly expressed in Article 2 (7) ,

is the rule of nonintervention in the domestic affairs o f any S t at e . A b s e n t
c o n s e n t b y t h e l e g i t im a t e gove r n me nt , U N tradit ional peaceke eping op era
tions are no t legally empowered to interfere in the int er nal affairs of Member
States. The tradit ional peacekeepers' mandate is suspect if the missio n canno t
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be executed on the basis of the go od faith consent and reliable c o o peration of
the contend ers in the c onflict. To stay wit hin the terms of the Charter, tradit ional
UN p e acekeepers are not to use ar med force against one domestic faction in

favor of another. The neutrality of the UN forces is lost when they take sides.

An additional consequence of taking sides is the loss of moral authority, an
asp ect critic al to the maintenance of the l on g-term cre dibility and effectiveness

of UN fo rces.

A third important element is that a traditional pe acekeeper is

the use oj force

not to resort to

except in strictly construed instances of individual or unit

self-defense. Armed conflict is to be avoided in th e deployment strat egy and in

the mind-set of the UN peacekeep ers. The tro ops are not en couraged to engage

in armed conflict, be cause they ther eby become swept up in the conflict. Use
of force by UN peac ekeep e rs only adds fuel to the fIre they are trying to help

extinguish. But when peacekeepers do use force affirmatively, they must expect
to be judged by the customary l aws of armed conflict . Military troops who

voluntarily engage in combat cannot have it both ways. UN traditional
peacekeep e rs deserve spe cial immunity and treatment as neutrals or " experts
on mission" only when they pro tect themselves or noncombatants entrusted to
6
But if they resort to the non-self-defense us e of force, i . e . ,

their pro tection .

engage in enforcement actions, they must r ightly expect to be treated as
combatants by their adversaries, against whom they may be employin g deadly
force . Co mbatant activities are inextricably linked to combatant le gal status fo r
the individual military participant , includin g treatment a s a prisoner of war if
cap tured. To avoid this, i. e . , to be entitled to be tre ated as, e.g. , " exp erts on
mission" as distinguish ed fro m " combatants," enforcement action mandates
sho uld

not

be

given

to

traditional

peacekeeping

op erations.

Likewise ,

peacekeeping labels sh ould not be attached to enforcement action op erations.
Enforcement actio ns should carry enforcement legal consequences, even if
labeled " pe ace enforcement" or "peace implementatio n , " to bro aden public
app eal .
Through out history, responsible natio ns have made co mmendable efforts to
gain universal accep tanc e of conventional and cust omary rules for ar med
co nflict that foster clarity between friend and fo e. I ndividual soldiers, who se
lives are on the lin e, cannot be left in doubt abo ut either their own status or
the status of their enemy. Political leaders, whether at the United Nations or in
Member States , should avoid policies or decisions that leave deliberate doubt
in an armed conflict on the critical question of whether individual troops are
noncombatants, combatants , or neutrals.
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Part of this study is directed toward reducing confusio n over mandat es in

UN or Nato-led p e acekeeping operati ons. Perfect clar ity in military operations

is a go al that is seldom achieved, even in the classic warfare sett ings such as were

the norm in World War II . However, it is painfully evident that vague rules of
engagement are being applie d in mixed " war-p eace" settin gs, all groupe d under
the broad-brush

rubric of peacekeeping. The lines between

traditional

peac ekeeping and genuine enforcement actions are being blurred, both con

sciously and unconsciously. Whatever the reasons for this development , a

pressing nee d exists fo r a clearer consensus among UN Members on a military

doctr ine fo r peacekeep ing operatio ns and on the Security Council's confer ring
mandat es consisten t with such doctr ine. The place t o st art is in refo r ming
S ecurity Council peacekeep ing mandates by drawing br ight lines between
traditional peacekeeping op erations and enforc ement actions. This app roac h is,
in fact, what was envisio ne d in the UN Charter. O nce t h at pr inciple is
understood and accepted, it can be demo nstrated h ow "mixed " op erations ou ght

to be conduct ed. A modest effort to illustrate this idea is given in several scenar i o s

i n Chapter I V of this study.
Fifty year s after the founding of the Unite d Nati o ns , th e fundamental legal

and institut ional arrangements in the Charter for d e al ing with international

peac e and secur ity issues are still workable. The p olitic al premise is still valid

that the United Nations ough t not to venture into the realm of armed conflict
in th e fac e of affirmative opp ositi on from any of th e five p o werful nations that

sit permanently on the S e c ur i t y Council . Despite the e c o nomic strength of
nations such as Ger many and Japan , th e rationale in the Charter for entrusting

the Se curity Council, as presen tly co nstituted, with UN multilateral use-of-force

dec isions, remains basi cally valid. In th e ser ious realm of UN us e of force, it is
prudent to try to make better that whi ch is known to work than to exp eriment
with unknowns. This is not to sugge st that wealthy States cannot play a le ading
role in p eacekeeping. M ilitary ventures are expen sive op erations, as t h e United
Nations has come to recognize. If we althy nat io ns want to p ay disproportio n
ately for peacekeeping o peratio ns, creative means sh oul d b e found to p ermit
th em to h ave p olitic al clout o n peaceke eping issues that are c o mmensurate with

th eir additional financial contr ibuti ons. Absent such an un antiCipated infusion
of funds, the United Nations cann o t afford to main tain p eaceke eping activit ies

at the level it h as in th e p ast . I t cannot afford to do so no t only because its le gal
basis to do so is question able, but also because it will e xh aust its fun ds for o ther

purposes if it does.
Ambitious p eacekeep ing experienc e sinc e th e end of the Cold War has
provided U N Memb ers with poignant l essons about the high cost of military
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operations. The Security Council has the clear le gal duty un der the Charter to
mo nitor pe ace-threatening situations and to authorize collective intervention
by armed fo rce as a last reso rt. But , absent disproportio n ate financial commit
ments such as the United State s made to the Se cur ity Coun cil fo r Haiti,
Members volun teer military perso nnel for peacekeeping operations and th e
General Assembly authorizes payment for them. This latter action is based on
the assumption that the Unite d Nations can raise th e money to pay for very
expensive UN peacekeeping op erations. Peacekeeping dec isions by the General
Assembly must take into account its finite re source s an d the fact that the United
Nations do e s some things b etter th an other things. Mo ney devoted to expensive
military ventures that it do e s no t do particularly well may take away resource s
from activities that i t does do well. Moreover, unlike military operations, the
diminished activitie s may well be ones that the United Nations itself was set up
to do. When the United Nations takes on tasks that it is le gally and institutio nally
ill - equipp ed to do, it is al so more likely to suffer failures. Failures do not promote
lasting peace and hurt th e overall cre dibility of the United N ations. Thus , there
are major drawbacks to consider when th e United Nations faces what may
superficially appear to be laudable tasks in the pursuit o f pe acekeeping, unless
th ere is genuine political will an d dedicated financ ial means to ach ieve the
mandate. Nations will not continue to sen d their citizens in harm's way unless
th e c o ntributing governments kn ow what to exp ect, both operatio nally an d
financ ially. In recent years, the Security Council has not always gotten it right .
Sometimes t h e mandate provides too much guidance a n d sometimes t o o littl e
with respect to UN sanctions or the use of force .
Improvement i n Security Council mandates and in General Assembly
finances is essential fo r the United Nations to remain effective in b o th traditio nal
peacekeeping and enfo rcement action operations. To o much re sponsibility for
military planning has re cently b een so ught by, delegated to, and accepted by the
S ecretary-General with re sp ect to peacekeepin g mandates. In sorting out proper
mandates, it cannot be overemphasized that the Secur ity Council alone retain s
not only the primary but al so the residual power and duty to deal with
int ernational p eace and security issues under the UN Charter. The enforcement
job was never intended for the Secretary-General an d his staff of profe ssio nal
international civil servants. Traditional peacekeeping, based on the consent of
the warring factions, is in principle entirely different . The main idea is that the
S ecur ity Council cannot claim authority without taking responsibility an d
accountability fo r global peace an d security. The Ch arter has it about right ; and
UN quasi-successes and failures in the realm of peacekeeping have come largely
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from n o t fo llowing the Charter's fundamen t al distinctions with resp ect to
defensive and offensive use of force, as intended and as written .
The mandates fo r the fo rty "peacekeeping" o perations author ized by the
Security Council since the fo unding of the United Nations through the end
of 1 99 5 are highlighted in the fo llowing review. This survey provide s a factual
context for assessing how to refo r m peacekeeping mandates, particul arly by
emphasizing the distin ction betwe en traditio nal peaceke eping and enforcement
acti ons. Peacekeeping op eratio ns still underway at the end o f 1 9 9 5 are identified
with an aste r isk.

1.*

UNTS O . The UN Truce Supervision Organization was the first

peacekeeping mission. It was auth orized in May 1 94 8 by Se curity Council
R esolution

(SCR)

5 0 . The Security Council called for a halt to the first

Arab -Israeli war and placed milit ary observers in the region near Palestine
to monitor cease-fires, t o supervise armistice agreements, to deter inci
dents, an d to assist in late r peaceke epin g operations, esp ecially by providin g
Military Observers to UNIFIL and UNDOF. UNTS O had 1 9 4 Military
O b servers in 1 9 9 5 , who cost the United Nations an estimated annual
amount of $28 . 6 millio n . UN TSO has incurred 38 fat alities over 47 ye ars
of operation.

2. *
was

UNMO G I P . The UN Military Ob server Group in India and Pakistan

autho rize d by the Se curity Council in SCR 47 and e st ablished in

January 1 9 49 . The mandate fo r UNM O GI P , provided in

SCR

9 1 , is t o

mon ito r the 1 94 9 Karachi Agreement ce ase-fire b etween India and
Pakistan and to discourage further fighting over the disputed state of
J ammu and K ashmir. UNMO G I P 's operations cost an e st imated annual
$7 . 2 million to the United Nations during 1 9 9 5 . This pays for ab out 44
Military Observers who have sustained 9 fatalities over 47 years.
3.

UNEF I . The first UN Emergency Force serve d b etween November

1 9 5 6 and June 1 9 67, after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal . France, the
United Kingdom, and I srael had intervened with armed fo rce s . The
involvement of two of the Permane nt Five nations with ve to powers
prevented the Security Council from responding to wh at was an obviou s
threat to international peace and security. An emergency General Assembly
session resulted in Gene ral Assembly Resolution 1 0 0 0 (adopted without
a negat ive vot e cast) mo re or less authorizing the first arme d UN
peacekeeping force . UNEF I t roops sup ervi sed the with drawal of the
ou tside fo rces and acted as a buffer between the disputants. UNEF I left
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after Egypt withdrew consent fo r it to be on Egyptian territo ry. One
"

month later, the June 1 967 "six-day war erupted.
4. uNOGIL. Th e pe a ce kee ping mandate for th e UN Observation Group
in Leb ano n arose out ofS CR 1 28 and lasted fromJun e 1 9 58 to D e cember
1 9 58. Leb anon had charged Syr ia with interference in its inter nal affairs.
UN OGI L observers en sured that personn el, arms, an d materials were n o t
inftltrated across Lebanese borders. The mission wa s termina ted, an d
UNOGIL with drew when tensions e ased.
5 . ONUC. The Op eration des Nations Unies a u Congo was a l arge scal e
-

operation in the Congo that technically l as t e d from July 1 9 60 to June
1 9 64 . S CR 1 4 3 auth orized the Se cretary-General to take the " ne cessary
steps" for military assistance and related activities to assist a n ewly
independent government restore order. ONUC went well b eyon d tradi 
tional peacekeeping. Congolese troo ps had mutinied and Belg i an forces
had intervened. The S e curi ty Coun c il authorized the establishment of a
UN operation that eve n tually re q u ired some 1 9 ,000 armed troops. For a
while , the United Nation s even assumed responsibility fo r the territorial
integrity and political indepen dence of the Congo. After four ye ars, the
Congolese government did not ask to extend O NUC, an d the Secretary
General ordered its withdrawal .
6. UNTEA/ UNSF. Th e UN S ec u r ity Force in West Irian serve d as a
Temporary Exe cutive Authority and se curity fo rc e . Th e Gen eral Assembly
(wit h no n e gative votes cast) authorized the S e cre t ary Ge neral in General
-

As s embly Re solution 1 752 to car ry out c ertain agre ed upon tasks with
respect to the hostilities between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West
Irian . A cease -fire arrangement gave the United N ations administrative
responsibility fo r the terr ito ry pending its transfer to I n donesia. This
mission, largely devoted to uph o ldin g the au tho r ity of UNTEA , laste d
from O ctober 1 9 62 to Apr il 1 9 63.
7.

UNYOM . The Yemen Observation Mission arose out of a rep ort by

S e c ret ar y General U Thant an d a subsequent S C R 1 79 , dur in gJun e 1 9 63 ,
-

that the supp ort by Egypt and S audi Arabia for compe ting fac tions in
Yemen 's civil war threatened a wider conflict that endangered interna
tional peace and securi t y. The Secretary's peace initiative led to an
ag ree m ent on di s engagem e nt and th e Security Council established UN
,

YOM , which oversaw implementation of the agreement from July 1 9 63
to September 1 9 64 .
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8. * UNFICYP. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus was establish ed
in March 1 964 by SCR 1 86 , with a mandate to serve on Cyprus to help

prevent vio lence between Greek- Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot commu
nities. The mandat e has b e e n renewe d at six-month intervals ever since.
Since 1 974 , UNFICYP has also been deployed along a buffer zone between
the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish military forces. The civilian
po lic e numbered 35 in 1 99 5 , while the tro op strength was 1 , 1 66. UNFI
CYP sustain e d 1 67 fat alities over 32 years o f op eration.

9.

D OMREP. The Dominican Republic Representat ive p e ac ekeeping

mi ssi o n invo lve d the dispatch , p u r s uan t to SCR 203 , of a Spec ial

Repre sentative of the S e cretary-Gen eral to the D o minican Republi c
i n May 1 9 65 . T h e Organizat ion o f t h e American S t at e s sen t a p eace
fo rc e and the United N ations s en t military observers to monitor a
c e ase -fire b e tween r ival gove rnment fo rc e s . T his was the first time a

UN p e aceke eping mission de alt with the same mat ters at the s am e time
as a re gio n al o rganizatio n . After a n ew government was installe d , th e
D ominican R epublic requested the withdrawal of the UN Mis sion ,
which was acc o mpli s h e d by 22 O ctober 1 9 6 6 .
1 0 . UN IPOM. T h e UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission also involved
India and Pakistan 's co ntinuing dispute over the territory of Kashmir. The
Se cur ity Council e st ab li s hed the UNIPOM , pursuant to S CR 21 1 , during
September 1 9 6 5 to conso lidate a cease-fire along t h e in t e r n a t i o n al
b o r d e r a n d t o sup e rv i s e t h e w i t h drawal o f t h e co ntending States'
resp ect ive fo rces. UNIPOM worked clo sely with the already existent
UNMOGI P . U NI PO M was disbanded, and UNMO GIP reverted to its

original monitoring ro l e after UNIPOM's mission was acc o mp lishe d in
March 1 96 6 .
1 1 . UNEF II. T h e S e c o n d U N Emergency Force was creat e d by the
Se cur ity Counc il in SCR 34 0 during O ctober 1 9 73 . Egyp t and I srael were
at war in the Suez Canal and Sinai re gions. With the consent of the
belligerents, UNE F II was interposed in the Suez Canal sector between

the op p o sing fo rces. After the belligerents agree d to withdraw, UNEF II
was disbanded in July 1 9 79.
1 2. * UND O F . The UN D isengagement Observer Force b e gan op erations
inJune 1 9 74, pursuant to SCR 3 5 0 . In May 1 9 74 , an uneasy truce betwe e n
I srael and Syr ia was brokered by the United States for the Go lan Heights .
The S e cur ity Council mandate e stablished UND OF to maintain a cease-
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fire to sup ervise the agreement on areas of separation and to ensure that
other limitations were observed by both sides. The estimated annual cost
to the United Nations for UNDOF is $32.2 million at the 1 99 5 force level

of approximately 1 ,200 personnel. UNDOF sustained 36 c asualties over a
21 -year sp an. UNDOF's man date continued throughout 1 996.
1 3 . * UNIFIL. Th e UN Inter im Forc e in Le ban o n was establishe d by

t h e S ecur ity Coun cil in S CR 4 2 5 during March 1 9 78. I srael ret aliated
agai nst a PLO c ommando raid by attac kin g PLO bases in southern

Lebanon . UNIFI L's mandate was t o confirm I sraeli wi thdrawal from
Lebanon and to ass ist the Leban e se government in rest or ing i t s effective
control in the are a. T h e Interim Force was un abl e to deploy fully, as
instruc te d , b e cause I srael insisted on maintain ing a " s e c ur ity zo n e "
north of th e Leban e se border and h anded over p ar t o f the are a t o
Le bane se

de facto

forc e s . T h e Interim Forc e remain e d to d amp e n

vio lence , t o promo te stability, and t o provide h umanit ar ian assis tan c e
t o the l o cal p o p ulace. Th e estimated annual c ost to t h e Un it e d N atio n s

fo r UNI F I L i n 1 9 95 was $ 1 42 . 3 million . This sum sup p o r ts approxi
mately 4 ,700 tro ops who h ave sustai n ed 207 fatalities over 1 7 years .
T h e man date fo r UNIFlL was stre aml i n e d in 1 9 9 5 an d t h e o p erati o n
was continu e d throughout 1 9 9 6 .

14.

UNGOMAP . This p e acekeepin g ac tivity i nvolve d t h e provis i o n o f

a UN G o o d O ffic e s Missi o n in Afgh anistan an d P akistan . T h e invasion

o f A fgh anistan by th e S ovi e t Union in late 1 9 7 9 predictably resul t e d
in a de adlo cke d debat e in t h e S e cur ity Council . The matter was
referre d , un der the " Uniting for Peac e " pro c e dure , to an emerge n cy
session of t h e General Assembly, which strongly c on d e mn e d the S ovie t
armed int ervention . In e arly 1 98 1 , the S e cre tary-General sent his
personal represen tative to the regi on to help n e go tiate a re s olut i o n of
the c o nflic t . On 8 April 1 9 8 8 , Gen eva A c c ord s were finalized b e twe e n
t h e Sovi e t Uni o n , Afghanistan , Paki stan, and t h e U n i t e d Stat es, provi d 
ing for the S ovi e t withdrawal and for noninterference b y Afghanistan
an d P akistan . T h e S e curity Council, in S C R 622 , co nfirmed the

arrangements in the Gen eva A c c o rds. UN monitors were dispatch e d ,

S oviet forces left , and UNG OMAP 's mandate was t e r minate d 1 5 March
1 990.
1 5 . UNIIMOG. The U N Iran-I raq Military Observer Group's mandate
was set out in S CR 5 9 8 , dur ing July 1 9 87 , when the Security Council
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authorized dire ct talks under the auspices of the S e cretary-General. I ran
and Iraq finally agreed in mid-1 9 8 8 , after eight years of blo o dy fighting,
to a ce ase -fire and the placement of UN observers in a classic buffe r role.
UNIIMOG it self thus ac tually functioned from Augus t 1 9 88 to February

1 9 9 1 . UNIIM O G forces were disbande d after confirming the withdrawal
from the territories respe ctively o ccupied by the forces of both Iran an d
Iraq.
1 6 . UNAVE M 1. The UN Angola Ver ification Mission was establish e d by

SCR 626 in December 1 9 8 8 , pursuant to a request from the governments
of Angola and Cuba. A 1 978 Security Council reso lution, SCR 4 35 , dealt
with the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops
from Ango la. Intensive mediation by the Unite d State s led to agreement
between Angola , Cuba, and South Africa for a phase d withdrawal of Cuban
tro ops fro m Angola. The role of the UN peacekeepers was to ver ify their
withdrawal, as agreed. UNAVEM I deployed fro m January 1 9 8 9 to the
successful fulftllment of it s mandate in Jun e 1 9 9 1 .
1 7 . UN TAG . The UN Transition Assist ance Group's peacekeepin g m i s 
s i o n i n N am i b i a l a s t e d fro m A p r il 1 9 8 9 t o M ar c h 1 9 9 0 . T h e
Se cur ity Council adopted SCR 435 dur ing S eptember 1 9 78 , which
contained a detailed plan for Namib ia's transition to indep endence
through free and fair elections. South Africa resisted this effort for ten
years, but the UNTAG o p eration, with many unique elements, was finally
launched in 1 9 8 9 . The S ecurity Council gave the Secretary-General a
far-reaching mandate which involved the United N ations dee ply in the
political pro ce ss of Namibia's transition fro m an o ccupi ed ter r it ory t o a
sovereign and independent State. Eventually, some 8 ,000 military an d
civilian personnel from 1 20 nations participat e d in UN TAG . The UN's
efforts resulted in Namibia's j o ining the Unit e d N atio ns in April 1 9 90 ,
after holding suc cessful democratic elections.
1 8 . ONUCA . The UN Observer Group in Central America peacekeep ing
operation , approved by SCR 644 , ran from November 1 9 89 to January
1 9 92. The Observer Group was part of extensive UN involvemen t in
assisting five Central American governments to ke ep their se cur ity com
mitments. The Security Council established O N UCA to assist in ver ifying
that the governments in the re gion were no longer providin g arms and
other aid to ir re gular forces . ONUCA force s lat er supporte d the voluntary
demobilization of over 2 0 , 000 members o f the Nicaraguan Resistance.
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1 9 . * UNIKOM. The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Missio n was author
ized in SCR 68 9 , following the suspension of hostilities after the U. S. an d
Saudi Arabian-le d multin ational coalition had restore d peace and security
in the region by expelling Iraq from Kuwait. UNIKOM be gan in April
1 9 9 1 with a mandate to monitor the Khor Abd Allah waterway and the
demilitar ized zone along the border betwe en Iraq an d Kuwait. The
mandate was exp anded in January 1 9 93 by SCR 806 with the additio n of
an infan try battalion. The estimate d annual cost to the United Nations in
1 9 95 for the UNIKOM peac ekeeping operation was $6 3 . 1 million to
provide a force level of ab out 1 , 1 00 , which has sustain ed three fatalities.
20 . UNAVEM II. The UN Angola Verification Mission II, authorized by
S C R 696 an d established in June 1 9 9 1 , con tinues through UNAVEM I I I .
When UNAVEM I fin ishe d, Angola requested assistance from t h e United
Nations in implemen ting c ease-fire agreements between its government
and the National Union for the To tal I n dependence of Angola (UNITA) .
UNI TA resisted acce pt ance of the re sults of demo crat ic elections held
on 30 S eptemb e r 1 9 92. UNAVE M II , which laste d until 8 February
1 9 9 5 , helped to end a 1 6 -ye ar c ivil war by provi ding military personnel
to observe a cease -fire an d by supp ortin g implementation of the "Acor
dos de Paz. "
21 . ONUSAL. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador was authorized
by the Security Council in May 1 9 9 1 by SCR 693. SCR 9 9 1 passed in
,

April 1 9 9 5 , terminated ONUSAL's mandate. ONUSAL was a combined
military and civilian operation that monitored agre ements between the
Salvado ran government an d th e FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti Para la
Liberacion Nacion al) to end more than a decade of civil war. Civilians
from ONUSAL began work before the declaration of a cease-fire an d
military personnel were sent

by

the Security Coun cil to help implement

the agreements. The mandate for ONUSAL was terminat ed followin g the
signing of a program of work to complete the Peace A ccord.
22 . * MI NURSO . The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara,
authorized in April 1 9 9 1 by SCR 6 9 0 , became operational in Sep temb er
1 9 9 1 . In August 1 9 88, the government of Morocco and the Polisar io Front
(Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de Rio de Oro)
agreed to a settlement plan in the disp uted terr itory of Western S ahara to
de termine its political future. MINURS O 's mandate is to complete the
pro cess of identifYing registere d vo ters and to ver ifY the cessation of
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ho stilities. The Se curity Council extended MINURS O's mandate through
out 1 99 6 . MI NURSO 's 1 9 95 fo rce level of 379 personnel co st the United
Nations an estimated $40.5 millio n . The MINURSO o p eration had
sustaine d seven fatalities by the end of 1 995 .
23 . UNAMIC. The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia was launched in
October 1 9 9 1 by

SCR

7 1 7 and termin ated in February 1 992 by

SCR

745 .

This advance mission of military observers p aved the way for the UN
Transition al Authority (UNTAC) operation in Cambo dia that immediately
fo llowed.
2 4 . * UN PROFOR . The UN Pro tectio n Force in the former Yugoslavia was
establishe d in February 1 9 92 by

SCR

7 4 3 , primarily with a humanitarian

assistance mandate . Approximately fo ur years later, UNPROFOR's greatly
expanded mandate was terminated upon the transfer of its authority to
IFOR

(I mplementation Force) . The mandate fo r

the S ecurity Council in

SCR

IFOR

was autho r ized by

1 03 1 on 1 5 Dec ember 1 9 95 , one day after

the signing in Paris of the Dayton General Framework Agre ement for
Peace in B o s nia and Herze govina.

IFOR

is a multinational military force

under unified control that is composed ofbo th Nato and no n-Nato units.
IFOR 's legal successor will be a multinatio nal stabilization force (SFOR) , also
un der unified co mmand. In SCR 7 1 3 o f 25 Septe mber 1 9 9 1 , the Secur ity
Council decided, under Chapter VII, to "immediately implement a general

and complete embargo on all deliveries of weap ons and military equipment
to Yugoslavia . . . . " During 1 9 95 , the co mplex situation in the former
Yugoslavia was the subj ect of more than 50 of the 1 29 resolution s adopted
and presidential statements issued by the Security Co uncil . Active involve 
ment by the Se curity Co uncil , begun after UN mediati o n , with E uropean
support, produced a cease -fire between the Yugoslav Natio nal Army and
ethn ic militias . Warring factions next requested a UN peacekeeping
op eratio n to end months of bitter fighting. The operational mandate of
UNPROFOR was extended to five republics of the former Yugoslavia-Croatia,

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia----and liaison to a

sixth, Slovenia. In Croatia, the UN Protection Force was to separate Croatian

and Krajina Seth fo rces, maintain cease-fir es, defend four protected areas
(UNPAs) and assist refugees. In Bosnia an d Herze govina , UNPROFOR (with
Nato air support) was to provide huma.nitarian escort op eratio ns, monitor
"no fly" zo nes an d six " safe area" zo nes, and facilitate ne go tiations betwe en
the Bosnian government an d B o snian Serbs. The goal o f th e negot iations
is to fo ster peaceful development of a B o snian State consisting o f two
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entities, the Feder ation of B o snia and Herzegovina and the Republika

Sr pska. In th e for mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR's

mandate was for a preventive deployment to keep the co nflict from
spreading int o that coun try. In SCR 7 5 7 , p assed in May 1 992, the Security
Council ac ted un der Chapter VII to imp o se an economic and air boycott

as well as an embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia an d

Montenegro) . In SCR 787 , sanctions were exp anded to include a shipping
embargo . SCR 820 authorized the imp o un dment an d forfeiture of " all

vessels, freight

vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft belonging to the Fede ral

Republic of Yugoslavia (S erbia and Monten egro) found viol ating S e curity
Council resolutions. "

UNPROFOR p olice monitors were depl oyed to

Macedo nia at the request of the gover nme n t in t h e fo rmer Yugoslav
R e p ublic o f M a c e d o n i a, by S C R 7 9 5 . In March 1 9 95 , by

SCR 982,
UNCRO in Croatia was separate d fro m UNPROFOR and, by SCR 98 3,
UNPREDEP in Macedonia was likewise split off. This r estruc turing o f
UNPROFOR left three separate peacekeeping missions under a single
co mmand (UNPF) . UNPF consists of the UN Confidence Restoration
Op erations in Cro atia (UNCRO) , the UN Preventive D eployment Force
(UNPREDEP) within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, an d
UNMIBH in B o snia an d Herzegovina. In S CR 1 035 , passed on 2 1
D e c ember 1 99 5 , t h e Se curity Council establish ed an Inter natio nal Police
Task Fo rc e

(IP T F) , a UN-run civilian p olice o peration c alled for under

the D ayton Agreement. Also fo llowing the D ayt on Agreement, the Coun 
cil lifted t h e arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia and susp ended the
sanctio ns imposed in 1 99 2 on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Monten egro) . Th e approximate cost to the United Nations fo r

UNPROFOR in 1 99 5 was ab out $ 1 . 6 billion , or about half of the entire
UN peacekeepi n g budget. The level of the UNPROFOR fo rces reached
some 4 0 , 0 00 p ersonnel in 1 99 5 , while 1 92 fatalitie s have occurre d sin c e
March 1 9 9 2 .
25 . UNTAC. The UN Transiti on al Author ity in Camb o dia d e p l oyment

was authorized in March 1 99 2 by SCR 74 5 , and its work was l argely
c o mpleted by the end o f 1 9 9 3 . U NTAC was establishe d by the

S e curity

Coun c il to implemen t the Paris A greements signed on 23 O ctober
1 9 9 1 by the fo ur warrin g fact io n s in Cambo dia.

UNTAC's mandate was

to cons olidate the c e ase -fire, to help admi n ister the c o u ntry, an d to
br ing ab out fre e and fair elec tions. Th e Par ty of D emo c ratic Kam
puchea

(PDK) fac ti on consist ently
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the Agre ements an d did n o t participate in the e l e c t o ral process. UNTAC
ultimately grew to a c o mbin e d civilian/military deployment of some

22,000 p ersonnel . UN c e rtified el ections were held fro m 23-28 May
1 9 9 3 . S CR 8 8 0 n o t e d the adoption of a c onstitution and the termina
tion o f U NTAC 's mandate after the establishment of a n ew government
o n 24 S e ptember 1 9 9 3 .

26 . UNOSOM 1 . T h e first U N Operation i n So malia was author ized i n
April 1 9 92 by S C R 75 1 . Th e man date was initially set u p b y t h e Secur ity
Council to mo nitor a cease- fire between r ival factions and to provide
security for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. A weap ons
embargo impo sed by SCR 733 had prove d ineffectual, and the humani
tar ian situation steadily deteriorated. SCR 794 , passed in D e c e mber 1 9 92,

author ized Member States to "use all necessary means" to pro tect relief
operatio ns. A Un ifi e d Task Forc e led by the United States o perated with
a peak strength of 37 ,000 tro ops until UNOSOM
March 1 9 9 3 by the cr eation of UN OS OM

I was terminated in
II, in S CR 8 1 4 .

27. UNO MSA. Th e UN Observer Missio n in South Africa was established

in August 1 992 by S CR 772 to monitor imp lementation of the Natio nal
Peace Accord. Upon submissio n of the {mal report o f the Secretary-Gen
eral that a "un ited, n o n -racial and democratic S o uth Africa" existed,
UNOMSA was t ermin ate d in June 1 994 by S CR 930.
28. ONUM O Z . The UN Operation in Mozamb ique was established by

the Security Council in December 1 992 by SCR 797 to mo nitor an d

guarantee the implementation of a general peace agreement between the
government o f Mozambique and the Resistencia N acional M o c ambi cana

(RENAMO) that ended 1 4 years of civil war. The agreement included a

cease-fire, the ho lding of presidential and legislative elections, and a force
demobilization. Considerable delay in implementation of th e agreement
occurred, particularly with respect to disarmament o f irregular tr oo ps. In
S CR 898, the Security Counc il authorized the deployment o f 1 , 1 44 UN
po lice observers. SCR 957 set 1 5 December 1 9 94 to terminate O NU
MOZ's mandate as satisfactory elections t o ok place on 27 and 28 October

1 994 . O N UMOZ's peacekeeping operations actually finished in January
1 99 5 .

29 . UNOSOM II. T h e original U N Operation i n S omalia was expanded
from the Unified Task Force (UN I TAF) and UNOSOM
establishment of UNOSOM

I thro ugh the
II in S CR 8 1 4 , passed in March 1 993 .
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UN OSOM II's broad man date was to provide humanitarian assistance, to
help in the repatr iation of refugees, to assist in the reestablishment of
infras tructure , to co operate in the removal of mines, and to aid in political
rec onciliation. Acting under Chapt er VI I , the Security Council asked the
Secretary-General to suppo rt the arms embargo usin g UNOSOM I I 's
forces and to provide secur ity for repatr iation of refugees. The Security
Co un cil requested the Secretary-General to direct the Force Co mman der
of UNOSOM I I to assume responsibility for a phased tran sitio n from
UNITAF to UNOSOM II . On 6 June 1 9 93 , in SCR 837, the S ecur ity
Council strongly condemned armed attacks by the Unite d Somali Co n
gress forces against UNOSOM II troops contributed fro m Pakistan . The
Se curity Council reaffirmed that th e Se cretary-General was authorize d
t o take "all necessary measures " against those responsible for the armed
attacks . The Security Co uncil also encouraged Member States to contrib 
ute military support t o meet the fu ll requirement of a force of 28,000

personnel. On 22 September 1 9 93 , in SCR 865 , the Security Council
called upon the Secretary-General to prepare a de tailed plan c overing

UNOSOM's humanitarian, political , and security strategy for S omalia. The
Se cretary-General was asked to assist in rebuil ding So mali political insti
tutions and in reestablishing its police, j udicial, and penal systems. In SCR
897, passed in February 1 99 4 , the S ecurity Council noted "that th e people
of Somalia bear the ultimat e responsibility for setting up viable national
political institutions and for reco nstructing th eir country. " The Council
also authorized the reduction of the UNOSOM II force level to 22,000.
SCR

923 p asse d o n 31 May 1 9 9 4 , c o ntained an acknowledgment of
,

"the absence of a government in Somalia . . . . " In March 1 99 4 , th e l e aders
o f maj or S omali factions si gn e d a D e clarat io n o f Nati o n al Reconcil i 
ation. S CR 954 terminated UNOSOM's mandate o n 3 1 March 1 9 95 after

UNOSOM I I forc es complete d the ir with drawal .
30 . UNOMUR . The UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda was estab
lishe d by SCR 846 in June 1 993 in respon se t o a request from the two
governments fo r the deployment of UN observers along the ir common
border. UNOMUR was deployed entirely in Uganda to verify that no

military assistance reached Rwanda where fighting raged betwe e n the
government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) . The
Se cretary-General also suppo rted the peace effo rts of the Organization of
Mrican Unity (OAU) by providing military exp erts to assist its N eutral
Military Observer Group. In M ay 1 9 94 , the Security Council extended
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UNOMUR's

observation

an d

monitor ing

activities

to

the

entire

Ugan da/Rwanda border. In SCR 928, pass ed in Jun e 1 9 94 , a phased
withdrawal was authorized and UNOMUR's mandat e was t erminated in
September 1 994.
3 1 . * UN OMI G. The UN Observer M ission in Georgia was established i n
A u g u s t 1 9 9 3 by S C R 8 5 8 as a prelude t o t h e p o ss i b l e e s t ab lishment
of a p eacekeeping mission to Abkhazia. A cease-fire agre ement signed on
27 July 1 9 93 between the Republic of Ge orgia and fo rces in Abkhazia
was followe d by a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 1 D e cember
1 99 3 . The dispute centers around the future politi cal status of Abkhazia,
where lo c al author ities tried to separate from the Republic of Georgia.
On 1 4 May 1 99 4 , the same parties also sign e d an Agreemen t on a
Cease-fire and Separation of Forces. To monitor compliance with the
cease-fire, a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) p e acekeeping
force was deployed, as requested by the leaders of Ge orgia and Ab khazia.
Th e Se cur ity Council, in SCR 937, increas ed the stren gth of UN O MIG's
milit ary ob server force and exp anded its mandate to monitor the CIS
peacekeeping operation. The mandate ofUNOMI G extende d throughout
1 9 96, in p art to deal with mounting concerns over human r ights. The
approximate annual cost to the United Natio ns for UNO MIG's force of
1 32 p ersonnel in 1 9 95 was $ 1 0 . 9 millio n .
3 2 . * UN OMIL. The UN Observer Mission in Lib eria was establishe d by
SCR

866 in Sept ember 1 9 93 after an embargo on munitions deliver ies to

Liberia was impose d by the Secur ity Coun cil , un der Chapter VI I , late in
1 9 92. The Cotonou Pe ac e Agreement, signed by three warr ing factio ns
on 25 July 1 99 3 , assign e d to the Economic C ommunity of West Afr ican
States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOM O G) the primary resp onsi
bil ity to sup ervise implement ation of military provisions directed at
restoring peace, security, and stability in Lib e ria. The S ecurity Council
establishe d UNOMIL with a man date to monitor and verify this process
and extended its mandate throughout 1 99 6 . The approximate annual cost
to the Unite d Nations for UNOMIL's deployment in 1 9 95 of 9 1 military
observers was $ 1 . 1 million.
33. * UNMIH. The UN Mission in Haiti was authorized in September
1 993 by SCR 867. From the outse t , the Security Council charact er ized

the circumstances in Haiti as "unique and exceptional. " In an agreement

signed on Governors Islan d in New York City, b o th Haiti's previously
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exiled presiden t,jean-B ertrand Ar istide, and its then co mman der-in-chief
of the armed forces, Raoul Ce dras, requested UN assistanc e in creating a
new police force for Haiti and in mo dernizing its armed forces. In resp onse ,
the Security Council dispat ched 5 6 7 UN po lic e monitors and a 700-per
so n military co nstruc tio n unit to assist H aiti. However, "armed fo rces"

there prevented the UNMIH personnel from starting their work. In SCR

873 , passed in O ctober 1 9 9 3 , the Secur ity Council determined that the
failure of the military authorities in Haiti to fulflll their obligat ions under
the " Governors I sland A greement " and to comply with relevant Secur ity
Council reso lutions constituted a " threat to peace and security in th e
region. " Accordingly, t h e Security Council reimp osed a strict embargo on
arms and petroleum pro ducts that was to remain in effect until demo crati
cally elected President Ar istide was reinstated and Haiti was in full
compliance with Se curity Council resolutions. In May 1 99 4 , the Security
Council imposed further economic sanctions that were no t to be lifted
until senior p olice and military leaders in Hait i stepped down. At the end
of july 1 9 9 4 , acting under Chapter VII of the Ch arter, Member States
were authorized to form a multinational force under unified command
and control. Within that framework, the fo rce was authorized to use "all
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military
leadership, consistent with the Governors Island A greement, the pro mpt
return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the
legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and
maintain a secure an d stable environment that will permit implement atio n
of the Governors Island Agreement , on the understanding that the c ost
of implementing this temporary operatio n will be borne by the partici
pating Member States. " As a practical mat ter, this meant that the multi
national force that landed on 1 9 S eptember 1 99 4 was provided and funded

almost ent irely by the United States. It was det ermin ed in SCR 97 5 , passed
in late january 1 99 5 , that Hait i was secure an d stable, an d plans were

launched to pass full responsibility from the mult inational force to UNMIH
by 3 1 March 1 9 9 5 . Preside ntial elections were held on 17 Dec ember 1 9 9 5
and a new president inaugurated shortly thereafter. T h e situation generally
stabilized while the S ecurity Council extended UNMIH's mandate
throughout 1 99 6. The approximat e cost to the United Nations for

UNMI H in 1 9 95 was $ 1 . 1 mill i on for an authorized level of personnel of
6 , 5 67 . UNMI H had suffered six fatalitie s through 1 9 9 5 .
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34. UNAM I R . The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda was established
by S CR 872 in October 1 9 93 t o assist in implementing the Arusha Peace
Agreement between the Hutu-dominat ed government of Rwanda and
the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) . UNAMIR was integrated
administratively with UNOMUR. On 6 April 1 9 94 , however, the presi
dents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed in an airplane crash, triggering
large-scale tribal geno cide in Rwanda. In mid-May 1 9 94 , by SCR 9 1 8 ,
the Security Council expanded the mandate of UN AM I R to include the
creation of secure humanitarian areas and the provision of security for the
distributio n of relief supplies. The Council expressly recognized that
UNAM I R personnel might be required to take action in their self-defense
and authorized a force of up to 5 , 500 troops. An arms embargo was also
imposed under Chapter VII . Th e Security Council deplored the displace
ment of some 1 .5 million Rwandan refugees. I n SCR 929 in June 1 9 9 4 ,
the Council stressed "the strictly humanitarian character of this op eratio n
wh ich shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and sh all
not constitute an interp osition force between the parties. " The Council
also determined that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis constituted
a threat to peace and security in the region. The Security Council also
approved France 's offer to undertake a multinational operation under its
command and control. This latter operation, whose cost was borne by the
Member States participating, was authorized to use "all ne cessary means
to achieve the humanitarian objectives . . . . " UNAM I R 's mandate was
extended by SCR 1 029 in December 1 9 9 5 , providing for the withdrawal
of UNAMIR's forces, starting on 8 March 1 99 6 . The approximate cost to
the United Nations for UNAM I R in 1 99 5 was $ 1 93 . 5 millio n at a strength
level of 5 , 5 22 perso nnel. However, in view of the reservations about the
UN presenc e expressed by the government of Rwanda in 1 9 95 , the
mandate was adjusted to further reduc e fo rce levels. UNAMI R had
sustained 26 fatalitie s through 1 99 5 .
35 .

UNASO G.The UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group was established by
the Security Council in May 1 99 4 by S CR 9 1 5 . The mandate was to
observe the implementation of the Surt Agreement signed by Chad an d
Libya on 4 Apr il 1 994 and to carry out the judgment of the Internatio nal
Court ofJustice relating to their disputed territories around the Aouzou
Strip. UNASOG's mission was successfully completed, and its man date
accordingly terminated by SCR 926 in June 1 9 94 .
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3 6 . * UNMOT. The UN Mission of Observers in Taj ikistan \.Vas auth o r ized

in December 1 99 4 by

SCR

968. U NMOT's mandate was regularly ex

tended and UNM OT 's activities continue d through 1 99 6 . UNMOT is to
assist the Tajik government, as well as its oppositio n , in monitoring
implementation o f a ce ase-fIre and in facilitating political discussions. A
Commonwe alth of Independent Stat es peaceke eping force, largely com
posed of Russian tro ops, h as been deployed al on g the Tajikistan border
with Afghanistan since 1 99 3 . The estimated annual cost to the United
Nations for the 44 milit ary observers was S l . 1 million in 1 99 5 .

UNMOT

had suffere d one fat ality as of the e nd of 1 99 5 .
37 . * UNAVEM

I I I . The U N Angola Ver ificatio n Mission provi ded for in

SCR 976 was establishe d in February 1 99 5 . A new mandate for the
peacekeeping operation in Angola \.Vas given , based on the Se cretary-Gen
eral 's recommendation that more than 7,000 peacekeepers h elp rebuild
the country. UNAVEM I l l 's mandate is to supervise implementation of the
"Acordos de paz" and the Lusaka Protocol between the Angolan gover n
ment and the Natio nal Union fo r the Total Indep endence of Angola

(UNITA) . The Secretary-General deployed peaceke epers in M ay and
III's man date was exten ded through 1 99 6 .

August 1 995 , an d UNAVEM

3 8 . * UNMIB H. T h e U N Mission i n B o snia an d H e rze govin a was

establish e d by S CR 1 03 5 in D e c e mb e r 1 9 9 5 . Th e International Police
Task F o rc e

(I PTF) , a p art of UNMIBH, c o n tinued its mission through

1 9 9 6 , c ar rying o ut th e tasks set o ut in Annex II of th e Dayton Peace

Agreement. I n p articular, I PTF will assist in the restructur ing of law
enforc ement agencies in B o snia an d H e rzegovina.
3 9 . * UNCRO . The UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia \.Vas

est ablishe d in SCR 9 8 1 , passed in M arch 1 99 5 . UNCRO \.Vas separated
from UN PROFOR . whose mandat e was to ensure the demilitar ization of
the UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) through th e withdrawal or disbandment
of all armed forces and to pro tect personnel in the UNPAs. The deployment
of UNCRO military observers was autho r ized in April 1 99 5 by SCR 9 90.
with th e mandat e to control . monitor. an d report on the borders between
Croatia and its ne ighbors. In p articular. emphasis \.Vas placed on normal
izing relations b etween Croatia and the Fe deral Republic of Yugoslavia
concernin g the disput e d issues pertainin g to th e Prevlaka peninsula. At
the end of 1 995 , of UNCRO's 1 , 5 00 perso nn el. 1 6 had suffere d fatalities .
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4 0 . * UNPREDEP. The UN Preventive D eploymen t Force for the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which arose out ofSCR 9 8 3 , and passed
in March 1 99 5 , changed UNPROFOR in Macedonia to UNPREDEP.The
man date of UNPREDE P remain s largely as o r iginally set in S C R 795,
passed in D e c ember 1 992. UN PRE DEP is t o keep armed conflict from
spre ading to the former Yugoslavia Republic of M ac edonia from either
of its ne ighbors, Albania or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) . The expectation is that there will be a p e aceful demarcation
of the border between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNPRED EP 's man date was extended
through 1 996 to maintain stability. UNPRE DEP consists of 1 , 1 50 military
personnel and 23 civilian policemen . UNPRE DEP forces had sustained
four fatalities by the end of 1 9 95 .

4 1 . UN TAE S . The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia,

B aranj a, and We stern S irmium was e stabli sh e d in S C R 1 03 7 , p assed in
January 1 99 6. A "B asic Agreement" o n th e re gion was signe d in
Novemb er 1 99 5 by t h e government of th e Republic of Croatia an d
the l o c al Serb community to fac ilitat e the p e ac e ful re turn of the
territories to Cro atia. UNTAE S ' p e acekeeping man d ate is to promot e
confiden c e amo ng all ethn i c gro ups , monitor demilitar ization and
refuge e s , and promote peaceful int egration dur ing the transitio n . The
man dat e of UNTAES extended thro ugh 1 9 9 6 .

42.

MINUGUA. T h e

U N M ission for t h e Verific ation o f H uman Rights

and of Compliance with the Compreh ensive Agreement on H uman

Rights in Guatemala was established in S CR 1 0 94 p assed 20 January 1 99 7 .

T h e mandate of MINUGUA i s to verify obs ervance of the p e a c e accords
between the governmen t of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria
Nacional Guatemalte c a

(URN G)

that started in e arly 1 994. SCR 1 094

authorized 1 5 5 mil itary o bservers and re quisite me dical personnel to
ver ify a ce ase-fire and demobilize URNG fo rces.

N.B. UNTAES and MINUGUA were mandated by the Se cur ity Coun cil after the general

cutoff date in this s tudy of 1 99 5 .

33

III

Context fo r Refor m i n g Peace kee p i ng M a nd ates

Traditi onal Peacekeep ing O perations

If N CHA PTE R II , atte ntion was drawn to the "pe acekeep ing" label that has
JL been placed o n a wid e variety o f missi o ns, some of which were c arried out
concurrently with humanitarian and enforcement action operatio n s. I n tradi 
tiona l peacekeeping deployments, at least four types of o perations can b e
distilled fr o m U N practice.

Observation operations, as the name implies, are to observe, monitor, verify and

report. This has been the most frequently used peacekeeping activity. UN observers
are customarily unarmed, but there are circumstances where limited p ersonal
self-defense cap abilities are necessary. Observer groups typically consist of military
offic ers and equivalent civilians. The size of the force may range fro m a few to
several hundred personnel . Missions may in clude observing cease-fire and
demarcation lines, confirming withdrawal of foreign forces, monitoring for war
preparations, reporting human rights abuses, ve rifying election pro cesses, and
inspecting for agreement compliance.An effective observer operat ion requires close
liaison with the involved p arties to maintain trust and to minimize incidents.
Regular p atrolling and the manning of observation posts further di;;courages armed
conflict.
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Interpositional o p e ratio n s try to ke e p o p p o sing fo r c e s s e p arate d . T h i s
o p eration is often deploye d immediately after t h e t ermination o r susp ension

o f ho stilitie s . The pe acekee p e r s . wh o are typ ically lightly arme d , are p o si
tio n e d be tween the b elligerents to create a buffer z o n e . The ab sence o f dire c t

contact b e t we e n h o stile fo rc e s is int e nd e d to h elp the p artie s n e go t iate a
l on ger term p e ac e s e ttlemen t . A gain , the size o f the fo rc e vari e s with th e
l o cati on an d t h e number o f c o mb atan ts. I n t er p o sition fo rces m ay h ave to
move in quickly, e spe c ially to o c cupy key ter rain . O p eratio ns invo lve
p atrolling actively, establishing ch e ckp o ints, and reacting promp tly. If t e n 
sions de cre as e sufficiently, interpo sitional o p erations may reve rt t o more
passive observer functio ns.

Transition assistance op erations c an help a nation move to a stable p o litical
condition and a mo re peaceful existenc e after a str uggle for independence or
civil strife . Th e peacekeepin g force may consist of police elements t o contain

violence and fo st er a return to n o rmal life . The warfare may h ave lett the co untry
impoverishe d , and assistan ce may be expected from th e peacekeepers in
rest oring infrastructure. Tasks may include civil administration , control of ar med
militia, co ll e ctio n and confis cation o f weapons, disar mament of military forces ,
supervisio n o f el ectio ns, maintenance of cease-fire zones, humanitarian aid and
refugee ass istan ce. Transition assistan c e o perations typically re quire a large force
with diverse capabilities. Personnel may or m ay no t c arry arms, dep endin g on
the danger involved, an d UN activities may b e under eith er military or civilian

co ntrol. Effective co ordination with o ther elements of the p eacekeepin g
op eration as well as with the l o c al leaders in the host State is essential . As the

situation stabilizes, civilian le aders should increasingly assume c o ntrol from

military co mman ders.

Preven tive deployment normally o c curs when the government or governments
in whose territory the operation is to be conduct ed re quest the deployment of
peacekeeping forces there to head off armed c o nflict. The peacekeep ers may

take up po sitions on both sides of a border, or even one side of a border, to

discourage hostilities. Preven tive deployment may include ground tro ops o n
the border or air and maritim e fo rces p atrol ling far from specific conflict areas.
Part of th e mandate may be to demonstrate a " show offorce , " fe atur ing military
resolve, to discourage unwan ted deployment of armed forces or to encourage
nego tiations on

a

p olitical settlement. Op erations may include p atrolling and

high visibility military training ac tivities.

36

What Color Helmet?

The UN a n d the Evolvi ng European Security Structure
As outlined in Chapter I of this study, the legal and institutional structure for

dec ision making in the UN Charter sets parameters for the conduct of b o th
traditional p eacekeeping and genuin e enforcement actions. In the most basic

sense, the Charter entrusts the Secur ity Council with the primary responsibility
to maintain international peace and security. The Se curity Coun cil alone is
expressly granted the power to authorize collective resp onses by UN Members,

by passing resolutions that man date enforcement actions, including the use of
military force. A s previously noted, the term " p e acekeeping" is no t mentione d
anywhere in t h e UN Chart er. A definition of these operations, th erefore , must

be disc erned from what the United N atio ns h as done and what its Member
Stat es h ave supp orted over the past 5 0 years. The l egitimacy of the o perations
dep ends, however, not only on what is done and is to lerated, but also up on

whether the activit ies comport with the purposes and allocations of p ower
provide d in the Chart er it self. The p o in t is that the legal st andards in the UN
Charter must be me t. The Charter remains th e constitution for UN activit ies.

I t is no t legally sufficient merely to no t e : "It's alright because the United Natio ns
did it and nob o dy complained. " The core idea abo ut the rule o flaw in t his area

is that the Charter must be respected by UN Memb ers just as the Unit e d States
Constitution must be resp ected by U S. citizens. In the Unite d N ations,

legitimacy der ives from the agreement made by the Member Stat es, j ust as in
the United States legitimacy c o mes from the consent o f the governed citizens
wh ose pact is expressed in th e U S . Constitut ion. It is not enough that
government officials, temporarily in power, want to do something or even h ave
done something without signific ant obj ecti o n . Respect fo r the rule of law
requires a thoughtful examination of the purposes an d the allo cations of power
within the constituting document , viewed as a whole. Only after an assessment
of the Charter text and whether the pract ice in question is consistent with it,
can a determination be prop erly made whether p ast an d future "peacekeeping"
operat ions actually comport with the agreements made by the sovereign S tate
Members. Unlike the US. domest ic judicial review o fco nstit utional issues, there
is no review provided in the Charter fo r S ecurity Council substant ive de cisions

if the Security Council acts in ac cordance with its pro c e dures. For example, the
S ecurity Council det ermine d that the circumstances in Haiti constituted a threat
to international peace and security. In one sense, this det ermination is all that

is legally required. The procedures in the Charter are me t. But ano ther view is
that substantive stan dards in the Charter still must be met, even if the procedures
available fo r substantive review are n o t particularly effe c t ive. Th e idea is that
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resp e ct for the rule oflaw dic tates that S e curity Council acti ons that are pro p erly
done as a mat ter of procedure are still op en to substantive chall enge. The
princ iple that ought no t to be lost in the rush o f any crisis is that all nations ,
persons, and institutio ns must follow b o th the pro cedures and substantive
st andards of the rule oflaw, esp ecially in the realm of UN p e acekeep ing in which
use of fo rce may be involved. The n o tio n is straightforward: if it is the law, all
must ob ey it. If the law is bad, change it . But to ignore law is to negate the forc e
of the rule oflaw. And without the rule of law, the commitments in the Charter
are meaningless. Nations either follow law, or they do not. I n principle, there is
no "pick an d cho o se" option to suit political convenience.
Th e 40 UN peacekeeping operations officially de s i gn ated as such through
th e end of 1 9 95 are outlined in Chap ter I I of this study. The wide variety of
activities reveal ed in this survey reinfo rces th e conclusi on that th ere are few
universally followed rules governing eith er tradition al peacekeep ing or UN
enforc ement ac tions. Lack of doctr inal clarity does not, h owever, deter the
Security Council from regularly adopting reso lutions mandating p eacekeeping
operatio ns . Unfortunately, the S e curity Council often do es n o t clearly distin 

guish be tween consensual operatio n s and enforc ement ac tions.
Article 9 7 of the UN Ch art er specifically labels the Se cretary-General as the
" Chief Admin istrative Officer" of the

United Nations. In the realm of

peacekeeping practice , however, the Se cretary-General has also assumed resp on
sibility for the organization, conduct, an d direc tion of military op erations. When
these duties entail ext ensive use of armed force , they c an h ardly be deemed
purely " administrative " in any ordinary sense . Rath er, these resp onsibilities are
akin to those of the Commander-in-Ch ief under the Constitution of the United
St ates. If this seems odd, recall that a leading role fo r the Military Staff

Committee in

plan nin g for th e Se curity Counc il 's use of ar med force was

envisioned in th e UN Chart er. As we have seen , this proved politically imprac
tical to implement. Although it is obvious that these duries ought to be
p erformed by military professi onals , an d th e Military S taff Committee has the
p otential to provide that service, th ere is no

"hue

and cry" to breathe life in t o

t h e Committee, a t least n o t t o the ext ent t h e Charter provide s . A n alternative

app ro ac h , to take advantage of th e ren ewed coo peration among th e Per manent
Five on secur ity matters, is for the United Nations to channel more enforcement
actions into Chap ter VI I I "re gion al organizations . " Member States, after all , do
have professio nal military personnel who c an be made available t o deal with
UN use of fo rce problems

under Secur ity Council direction. The mo st influ

ential C h a pte r V I I I regional alliances pertain to Europe. And, while n o t a
Chapter VI I I entity, th e most fo rmidable military organization in the wo rld ,
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Nato, is lo cated there. Th e S e curity Co unc il understandably has turne d to Nato
for help on the UN's most pre ssin g security problem, the situation in the former
Yugoslavia. As we previ ously no ted, however, using Nato as a Chapter VI I I
enforc ement entity i s a legal problem, since Nato was no t s e t u p to serve un der
the Se curity Co uncil as a colle ctive security organizatio n.
By contrast , the "Helsinki Summit Dec laration" of 1 0 July 1 9 92 made it clear
that the Council of the Conferenc e on Se curity and Cooperatio n in Euro pe

(CSCE )

was willing to undertake peacekeepin g operatio ns un der Chapter VI I I

i n cases o f conflict within o r am ong partic ipating States. Th e Council i s the
central dec ision-making and governing b o dy of the Conferen c e , and it meets
annually at either the Heads o f Gover nment or Foreign Minister level . B etween
Council me etings, the Co mmitte e of Senior Officials or its Permanent Com
mittee in Vienna is resp onsible for management and decisio n making. In
principle, decisions are made by conse nsus. The CSCE , which was create d in
1 9 75 , was expanded to include not only the United S tat es, Canada, an d almo st
all Europe an States but also all of the newly independent States of the former
Sovi et Unio n. In 1 9 95 , the CSCE was ren amed the " Organizatio n for S e curity
and Co operation in Euro p e , " and its acronym changed to OSCE.
The 5 2 M embers of the oseE quality, in their collective capac ity, as a
"Regional Arrangem ent " under Chapter VI I I of the UN Charter. As such, the
UN Charter provide s that the Security Council may delegat e authority to the
OSCE to take enforcement action on behalf of the United N ations. Nato , in

turn, has offered to provide military support for O S CE peacekeeping operati o ns.
From an international law po int of view, th ere is no thing to preclude Nato from
serving as a contributing entity to an OSCE peaceke eping operatio n. U. S.
domestic law is another matt er. Th e O S CE organization itself can play a dire ct
role in conflict prevention ac tivities such as fact-fmding, mediation, and c o o p 
eration with other sec urity organizations. Given i t s l o n g experienc e , expertise,
and available resources to supp o rt large -scale military operatio ns, Nato is
uniquely qualifie d, in a practical sense, to carry out peacekeeping assignments
that require the use of any significant military force. To repeat, however, Nato was
no t set up to operate under the Security Council, as is required by Chapter VII I .
I n De cember 1 99 1 , a t the Euro pean Community summit i n Maastr icht , a
dual role fo r the Western European Union (WEU) was announced. The WE U
i s t o emb o dy the European defense entity and t o function a s the European pillar
within Nato. The ten -nation defense wing ofWEU force s (out of the 1 5 -nation
European Union) are to be mult inat io nal , including the EUROCORPS (French
German) , EUROFOR (French, Italian , Spanish , and Portuguese force s for rapid
reaction in the southern region) , and EUROMARFOR (all-Memb er maritime
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force} . Th ese formations will be subordinate to Nato when they operate under
it. However, it is likely to be only a matter of time until Nato assets will be used
for pe acekeeping and o ther military operation s under the auspices of the WE U.
The WEU de termine d that WEU Members may n o t invoke the automatic
military assistance provisions betwe en WE U Members again st a Nato Member
nor may Ar ticle 5 of the No rth Atlantic Treaty be invoked against a WE U
Member. Se tting aside the vexing que stion o f wh o has binding auth ority to
interpret conflicts between WEU and Nato mandates, there is, without doubt,
an overlap between the respective secur ity roles now given to the E U and Nato.
Any resultin g confusio n may be attribute d to the fact that there is, as yet , no
agreed upo n p olicy amon g all th e Member nations on the re spec tive security
and defense roles to be playe d by e ach organization. For that matter, there is no
agre ed up on strategy for international se curity in th e North Atlantic region .
The United Stat es, for its part, has made it clear that Nato is the avenue through
which secur i ty consultations are to be made and maj or issues determin ed. It
remains to be se en how long this U. S. policy can be sustained. Partisan political
controversy is likely to emerge in the Unite d States over Nato 's role, espec ially
as the real financial costs in B o snia surface. I t is po ssible that a co alition of
like -minde d States may form be twe en European Powers to assume (and pay
for) a greater role in European security. A conservative U.S . Congress may even
be happy to have th em do so.
Another potential Chapter VI I I regional organization in Europe is the North
Atlantic Co operation Council

(NACC) , wh ose genesis

was in the Declaration

on Pe ace and Co operation issued at the Nato Summit M e e ting in November
1 991 .

NACC's primary role is to se rve as the vehicle fo r western European

support for reform occurring in th e countries of cen tral and eastern Europe .
Nato Members were in favor of the steps bein g taken toward demo cratic refor m
and invite d the natio ns concerned to participate in appropriate forums. The
States of the fo rmer Soviet Union and post-Co mmunist Europe j o ined th e

NACC, enlarging its membership to thirty-eight. This opened another new,
post-Cold War venue for co ntact and consultation with countries, such as
Russia, about military matters, includin g peacekeeping.

NACC has the potent ial

to be a Chapter VI I I regional organization , but as a matter of state d policy, NACC
itself currently has no ope rational role in peacekeepin g. In fac t, N ato leaders
decided in 1 9 92 to op erate out of the region only under UN or

OSCE mandate.

For example, the Nato-led op eration in B o snia, wh ich clearly is not in the
territory of any Nato Members, is under UN mandate .
In Chapter I of this study, it was no ted that Article 5 of the No rth Atlantic
Treaty provi des that an armed attack against any Party's territory in Europe or

40

"What Color Helmet?

North Amer ica sh all be considere d an attack against all Nato Parties. Nato was
creat e d to provide a collective secur ity bulwark against aggression by Warsaw
Pact Members, esp ecially the Soviet Union . However, when the Warsaw Pact
disinte grate d , the collective self-defense rationale , upon which Nato was
founded under Articl e 5 1 of the Charter, came into question. The ori ginal
reasons for a Nato military organization to pro tect against an ar med attack from
the Sovie t Union no lo nger existed . There are , of course, new threats, and few
suggest that Nato be immediately disbanded . At the same time, N ato is under
scrutiny; it inevitably must be reformed to respond t o the new European secur ity
environment. The Cold War Nato, co nstitute d under the North Atlantic Treaty
as an Articl e 5 1 self-defense organizat ion, is at the threshold o f a per i o d of
adjustment .
In recognition of this reality, the Nato summit in January 1 99 4 e ndorsed the
co ncept of Combine d Joint Task Forces an d launched the Partn ership for Peace
init iative. The Combined Joint Task Force concept envisions a milit ary operat ion
using el ements of the allian ce's command structure but drawi n g forces only
from Members willing t o co ntribute . Twenty-two non-Nato countries, with
diverse languages and cultures, have starte d to c o operate along these lines with
Nato in various ways. Their first j o int exercise, " C o -operative B r idge," was held
in September 1 994. Th e N ato Partnership for Peace/ Combined Joint Task Force
Program was expected to provide the princ ipal means to int egrat e non-Nato

tro ops into UN peacekeeping operations. With this in mind, Nat o 's Secretary
General released a study in mid-1 995 on the qu estion of Nat o 's enlargement

e astward. The Partnership for Peace initiative had grown to 26 Members,
includin g all 1 5 of th e former Soviet republ ics. Although no decision on the
admission of new parties t o the North Atlantic Treaty is expected until 1 9 97 ,
or later, the importan c e of Nat o 's future memb ership raises criti cal security
questions. Should former en emies of Nato become parties to the No rth Atlantic
Treaty without compl etely rethinking Nato ? What security threats do e s the
Treaty now guard against? What type of c o lle ctive security organization, if any,
is needed for the new Europe? Would Russia ever agree t o an expanded Nato ?
How ab out a less threatening N ato or Nat o plus partners? Wo uld Russia put
its tro ops dire ctly under Nato command? Likewise, wo uld the Unit e d States
put its tro ops under th e operatio nal command of Russians in so me fo rm of an
expanded Nato ? What are the co sts and time-frames to integrat e appl icant States'
personnel , equipment , and doctrine into a revised N ato ? What will be the
financial cost t o the West for expanding Nato membership eastward ? Would
current Nato nations be willing to commit t o take action in ethnic strife
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between States or groups located in the former Warsaw Pact natio ns? In the
final an alysis, would expansion of Nato stabilize or destabilize Europe?
From a domestic U. S. perspective , would Congress approve new Nato
Members from the fo rmer Communist East ? What wo uld be the financial or
other costs to secure the vo tes of all 15 other Members of Nato who must agree
to new Members as re quired by the North Atlantic Treaty?
The Nato all iance has enormous political, economic , and military significance,
no t only for Europe but also for the world. Nato nations rightly ought to proceed
cautiously on expansion to avoid creating unrealistic expe ctations. Political rhetoric
is important and symbolic generalizations to garner public support have their place.
But Nato is in the business of life or de ath o n a vast scale. Serious issue s such as
this merit open de bate at the highest policy levels between the nations con cerned
and between the Clinton administration and the U. S. Congress. It is not clear that
this debate has been encouraged. In any case, political acceptance as well as
integration will be a slow pro ce ss. Greater relative responsibility for Europeans in
providing fo r their own defense may be one emerging trend. In the meantime,
Nato has offered to play the role of executive agent for both the United Nations
and, as note d above, for the

OSCE, eith er in traditional peacekeeping or in Charter

enforcement operations.
One practical resp onse by Nato to the new security environment in Europe
was to adopt the con cept of the Rapid Resp onse Corps. First , Allied Mobile
Forces are to meet the need fo r small , immediate interven tion operations. The
next larger group is the Atlantic Alliance's Rapid Response Corps
co nsisting of units from thirte en countries as of 1 9 95 . The

(ARRC)
ARRC is to be ready

,

for action within one to two we eks after notice. The third level is Nat o 's principal
defense forces in the nations of the sixteen Parties . The final military fo rce is
composed of reinforcements re sulting from mobilizat ion in individual Nato
States. The

ARRC is thus the main peacekeeping forc e available fo r crisis
ARRC to have ten divisions

management planning in N ato. Plans are for the
amounting to 400,000 tro ops

?

Some units will be genuinely multinational,

while o thers will be formed princ ipally, or entirely, from one country.

Peacekeeping Ter mi nology
An imp ortant element in formulating mandates for p eacekeeping operations
that may be commanded by the United Nations or by Nat o nations is agree d
upo n terms and defmitio ns pertaining to the use offo rc e . T h e starting point for
analysis on this topic is the outlook at the United Nations that is provided in
UN S e cretary-General Boutro s Boutro s-Ghali's discussion of peace support
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operations in "An Agenda for Peace. ,,8 This pamphlet, which was published in
July 1 992, defmes four types of op erations:
Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes fro m ar ising betwe en parties,
to prevent existin g disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread
of confl i cts when they occur.
Peacemaking is action to bring hostile p arties to agreement, essent ially through
such peaceful means as those fo reseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
Peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presen ce in the fleld, hitherto with
the consent of all the p arties c oncern e d . normally involving UN military
and/ o r police p ersonnel and fre quently c ivilian s as well .
Peacebuilding is action to identify an d support structures which will tend to
strengthen and so lidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into co nflict.
In a supplement to "An Agenda for Peace, " dated 3 January 1 995 , the
Secretary-General identifies six "Instrument s for Peace and Security. " These
are : preventive diplomacy and peacemakin g, peaceke eping, post-conflict peace
9
With respect t o

building, disarmament, sanctions, an d enforcement action.

p eacekeeping, th e Secretary-General state s: " [C] ertain basic pr inciples of peace
keeping are essential to its succe ss. Three particularly important pr inciples are
the consent of the parties, imp artiality, and the non-use of fo rce except in

self-defense. Analysis of recent succ esses an d failures shows that in all the

suc cesses those principles were respected and in most of the less successful
.
,,10
operations o n e o r th e o th e r 0 f th em wa s no t.
The Secret ary-General went on to observe that "the logic of peace-keeping
flows from po litical and military premises that are quite distinct from those of
enforcement . . . . To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the

viability of th e peace-keep ing operati on and endanger its personnel. " 1 1 The
Se cretary-General and his S ecretar iat obviously learned important lessons from

UN peacekeeping experiences dur ing the period from 1 992, when "An Agenda
for Peac e " was publish ed, and 1 995 , when the "Supplement " was issued. More
realistic attitudes by the Secretary-General on peacekeep ing o perations are,
indeed, welcome. Now the trick will be to persuade Security Council Members,
particularly the United States, to be more disciplined in fo rmulating and issuing
p eacekeeping mandates.
In the 1 995 Supplem ent, the Secretary-General highlights the difference
between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions by listin g the latter
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last in his new hierarchy of instruments fo r peace an d secur ity. Peacekeeping
and enfo rcement action are n o t simply lumped t o gether under

a

peacekeeping

heading; three other listings are delibe rately pl aced in between . Interestingly,

the word "hitherto " (s ee above) is omitt ed in the mo re rec ent reference to th e
co nsent requirement in peaceke eping. This is not a mere drafting point but a
signal of significan ce. O n e may conclude that the Secretary-General is exp ress

ing a renewed appreciation o f th e necessity fo r con sent in p ea cekeeping
ope ration s that he supervises . However, the Secretary-Gene ral still clings to the
ho pe that the Unit e d Nations, as such , "in the long run " will develop the
12
capacity to "deploy, direct, command and contro l " enfo rcement operatio ns.
Given no mention o f a time frame , su ch theoreti c al musing i s probably har mless ,
but it is still misguided . The Secretary-General is not set up, politically,

institutionally, legally, financially, or in any other way, to provide co mma nd an d
control for enfo rcement action operatio ns. On the one hand, the Secretary
General appears to recognize this p o int; on the other han d, he keeps the fl a me
flickering to accept enfo rcement assignments from th e Security Council .

T h e thinking of the N o rth A tlantic Military Committ ee of the NACC o n

combin ed peacekeepin g ope rations i s disc ussed in a March 1 9 9 4 paper entitle d
" Co operation i n Plannin g . " 1 3 This document may n ow b e overtaken b y events,

but it st ill contains useful insights fo r the purposes of this study. The goal o f this

unclassified paper was to provide a common NACC b asis for peacekeeping

planning. These Planning Guidelines were based o n the principles, cr iter ia, and
defmitio n s in the NACC Ad Hoc Group (NACC- AHG) Rep o rt endorsed by
the Minist ers in Ath ens, Greece, on 1 1 June 1 9 9 3 . This is a helpful guide to

discuss issues that must be considered in for mulating Secur ity Co un c il mandates
for combined multinatio nal "peacekeeping" operatio ns.
The first problem encountered by the " Cooperation in Peac e keepin g Plan 
nin g Working Group " was a need fo r agreement betwe e n the United N ations

and th e O S CE o n terminology and defmitions abo ut use o f fo rc e terms in

p e acekeeping. Consideration was given to u s ing the UN Sec retary- Ge neral's
term "peace support operatio ns " as a gen e ral cove r-te r m to describe all

operations in suppo rt of the United N ations, e.g. , co nflict preven tion , peac e 
making, peacekeeping, humanitar ian aid , peace enfo rcement, a n d peace-buil d
ing. Proponents urged that the generic term covered all types of operatio ns ,

emphasized the importan c e of peaceke e ping expansion , rec o gnized the diffi
culty in separating the range of operations, and met the d emand for options
beyond tradition al peacekeeping.
The t e r m was no t adopted by the Wo rking Group, however, because it is n o t
in common use a n d acc e ptan ce. Th e belief was that even when i t wa s used, it
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was used inconsistently. More over, the t erm " p e ace support operations " glossed
over the fact that co nflict prevention, peacemaking, peace-building, and hu
manitarian aid in the first instan ce, peacekeeping in the sec o nd instance , and
enforcement measures in the third instance, while int er-related, are very
differen t. Moreover, and this was importan t for the Working Group, as " p eace
support operations" included "peace enforcement , " the term exceeded the
accepted scope of the NACC's p olicy mandate. This po int might well b e noted
by the UN Secretary-General as well. The Group 's main subst antive concern,
however, was abo ut blurring the distinction between "peacekeeping" and
"peace enforcemen t , " and with the ambiguity an d vagueness that results. The
NACC -AHG stress ed that the main difference between "peac eke eping" an d
"peace enforcement " was the co nsent of the parties and impartial ity in the first
cas e and the application of warfighting or coercive techniques in the sec ond
case. Th e chair man of the AHG emphasized that ano ther important distinction
was not the level of violence, but rather the change in the status of the
combatants that oc curs when enforcement troops take a side in the conflict .

Again, the UN S ecretary-General as well as the I F O R co mmanders o ught t o

pay close attention to this point .
The difficulties with the expressio n "peace enforcement" h ave already been
stressed throughout this study. D espite its widespread popularity, the t erm is a
misnomer whose meaning obfuscat es rather than clarifies thinking. While the
look and sound of the phrase may appeal t o the public at large, it is r ife with
mischief from misunderstandin g. This is immediately evident by noting the
co ntradiction be tween the words "peace " and " enfo rcemen t . " If there is peace ,

wh at is there to enforce? If enforcement is required, how can peace be said to

exist ? It is easier to understan d the concept of a peace to be kept than one that
must be enforced or "implemented. " Use of misleading terminology j ust t o

keep t h e term "peace " in t h e label should b e discouraged, for i t blurs t h e essential
le gal dist inction under the Chart er be tween traditional peacekeeping practices
and genuin e Chapter VII or VI II enforcement actions. Not surprisingly, the UN
Charter is no t the so urce of the phrase "peace enforcement . " Rather, the UN
Charter term that refers to general Chapter VII authorizat ions is " enforcement
measures. " The specific term, emb odied in Article 42, to connote even great er
use of armed force against a no n-consenting party is " enforcement action. "
These Chart er terms are used correctly in this study wherever po ssible. The
term " enforcement measures , " t aken from Article 4 1 , refers to c o ercive means
such as e c o no mic sanctions, interruption of c o mmunications, and diplomatic
pressures. I t is also bro ad enough t o include more dir e ct use of military force .
For this latter idea, however, the ter m " enforcement action," taken from Article
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42, is even more accurate and is use d in this study when the narrOwer meaning
is intended.

N ato

Peacekeeping M a n d ate s

Principles . As we have see n , part of the reason that the term "p eaceke ep ing"

suffers trom imprecisio n is that the concept derived from UN and State practice ,
no t from express terms in the Charter. The advantage of the loose, ordinary
sen se in which it is commonly employe d by the press and the general public is

that the term conveys an idea that people perceive they understand. It is for that
reason that the expression "peacekeeping operation " is used in this study to
enc ompass both traditional peacekeeping and enforcement operations. I t is
stresse d, however, that these two phrases refe r to markedly differen t concepts

un der the UN Charter-the former to be run by the Secretariat and the latter
by the S e curity Council. The most important result is that a traditional
peacekeeping mandate implies, in principle, no n e e d for the use of armed force
while an enforcement action mandate authorizes , in pr inciple , the use of armed
force . Looked at in an other way, traditional peacekeepers operate at the beh est
of all th e parties to the conflic t o r dispute. Enforcement troops, by co ntrast, are
tasked to enforce the will of th e Se curity Council on the non-consenting
factions or S tates.
When Nato leaders decided in 1 99 2 that N ato would undertake peacekeep

ing operations out of the region only under UN or OSeE mandate, this de cision

was consistent with Nato 's status as an Article 51 (Chap ter VII) self-defense
organization as dis tinguish e d trom an Article 53 (Chap ter

VIII)

collective

security organization . But the doo r was l eft open for Nato to undertake
peacekeeping o perations within the re gion either as it was or as an expanded
Nato , or as a regional organization composed of both Nato memb ers and new
"partners" from the former Soviet bloc. We n ow see IFOR operating outside
the Nato treaty re gion in Bosnia and there is also discussion about using Nato
forces clearly o utside the Parties' territories in Nato 's southern flank. Whatever
form multilateral peacekeeping operations take within th e Nato environment,
development of a common doctr in e for the use of armed force must be a
priority. Join t exerci�es with diverse nation participat ion are highly desirable
prior to an actual military deployment. Moreover, at the moment, they seem
to play well politically. This enc ourages even greater efforts at co ordinatio n
among t h e prosp ective nations, and that i s all to th e go od. However, war games

are not the same as actual engagement in arme d conflict. An expanded Nato
has a long way to go b efor e new members will o perate smoo thly in truly ho stile
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situat ions without creating unacceptable dangers. A cco rdin gly, careful att en tion
ought to be given to the framing of Security Coun cil man dates and the essential
operating requirements to impl ement them well before th e time arrives to
deploy such N ato forces in c o mbat.
Based on th e forego ing review of the UN Ch arter and subsequent p e acekeep
ing practice, the author concludes that a Se cur ity Coun c il mandate fo r any
combined multinational peacekeeping operatio n that might invo lve traditional
peacekeeping as well as enfo rcement measures , po ssibly including expanded
Nato military fo rces , ought to include th e following pr inciples:
1 . Peacekeeping operatio ns will b e carried out only at the request an d under
the author ity of eith er the UN Security Council under Chapter

oseE under Chapter

VII

or the

VII I .

2. The UN S e curity Co unc il o r the O S CE will co nsult with contributing

States on a case-by-case basis to determine command an d co ntrol arrangements
tailored to each peacekeeping operation.
3 . Peac ekeeping op erations will be undertaken only to support the achieve 
ment of clearly defined and agreed upon political objectives as determin ed by
the UN S ecurity Council or OSCE mandating autho rity.
4 . Peacekeeping operatio ns will have cl early establishe d conditions for with 
drawal, termination, or escal atio n.

5. Firm financial commitments to p ay fo r the p e ac ekeeping operatio ns will
be agreed upon before military forces deploy.

Operating Requirements . The distinction between peacekeeping and
enfo rcement action is fundamentally impo rtant for yet another reason . The
status of individuals under international law is directly linked to their use or
no nuse of armed fo rce. Consistent with that l ine of reaso ning, traditio nal
p e ac ekeeping fo rc e s o ught to enj oy the status of n eutral s , while multinational
forces engaged in UN enfo rcement actio n o ught to be treate d as c o mb atants .

Despite the obvious nee d for clar ity on this matt er, Nato as well as other
Member State forces may be tasked to perform operations bro adly labeled as
"peacekeeping" which , in fact, co nsist of a mixture of activities ranging from

humanit ar ian assistance to full -fledged enforcement actio n. In this setting,
Daniel and Hayes have identified a spe ctrum of op erations with thre e ben ch
14
marks: traditional peacekeeping, inducement, and enfo rcement. They propose
thoughtful reco mmendatio ns to deal , in particular, with what they refer to as
inducement operations in the "middle gro un d . "
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The mixed " war-peace " setting is, indeed, the central pro ble m that must be
addresse d in devel oping ration al mandates to guide multinational military fo rce!1-

engaged in peacekeeping operatio m. The problem i!1- m O !1-t acute in !1-ituatio m
where a wide range of UN-sanctio ned activities i!1- underway in the same are a
at the same time. The metho dology cho sen in thi!1- study, to stimulate dis cU!1.!1-io n

on how multin ational fo rc es ou gh t to o perate in "middle gro und" settings , fint

dist inguishes three groups by the colon of their helmet!1-. For discussio n
purpose!1-, "White H elme ts" are declared to be noncombatant!1-. "Blue Helmets"

are the traditional, n eutral UN peacekeep ers. " Green H elmet!1-" are the normal
military combatan ts maintained by Me mber S tates.
The fo remost requirement for any p e acekeeping mis!1-ion is a clearly defin ed
objective. If th e mandate i!1- not easily understo od, or if th e guidanc e from
political author ities keeps changing, or if the military go als are ambiguous or
co ntradictory, peacekeeping forces will be confuse d . In ad ditio n , the tro ops of
co ntending factio ns may become confuse d. C onfused tro o ps are prone to make
deadly mistakes. Accordingly, the designate d colle ctive secur ity co mman d an d
its contr ibuting M embers must co mult early and often t o ensure that the
mandate for the p eacekeeping op eratio n is fully underst o o d at all levels. Fro m
the out!1-e t, the operatio nal commander must kn ow what is exp e c ted to e nsure
that su itable forces are !1-elected for th e specifIC nilssion. Once underway, " nils!1-ion
creep" sho uld o c cur o nly by delib erate po litic al decision. The temp tation to be
helpful will sometimes be overwhelmin g for commander!1- on the !1-ce ne , but it
must be resisted if th e pro posed activity does not contribute dire c tly to
accompli!1-hment o f the mi!1-si o n .
A second requirement, which ap plies only i n t h e traditional peacekeep in g
op eration, is that the Blue H elmet!1- must remain m ictly neutral and imp artial .
The credibility of UN forces as unbiased repre!1-entative s o f all natio ns preserving
peace rests on c onduct by its individual commanders and th eir tro ops that is ,
and i!1- p erceived by the disputan t!1- to be, even-handed. The Blue H elmets must

no t favor o n e faction or protect one contending group with greater vigor than
another. Moreover, the protection or immunity that attaches to e ither Wh ite
Helmet noncombatants or Blue Helmet n eutrah is jeop ardized wh erever they
and Green Helmet combatants are unnecessar ily commingled physically. Blue
Helmets cannot initiate the use of offensive military force and expect immunity
from those th ey attack. Equally, Green Helmet combatants c annot hide behind

a Blue sh ield when their rul e s of engagement allow offensive use of nlll itary

weapons.
A third re quirement is that warring parties to the c o nflict truly consent, in
good faith , to th e presence and plann e d operatiom of the Blue H elmets. From
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an internatio nal law standpoint , one of the c o nsenting parti es that must agree
to th e presence of the UN-sanctioned peacekeeping fo rc es is the legally
recognized government of the host natio n . The Security Co uncil must not
expect the Secretary-General to take on the role of an invading commander.
For his part, when ho st nation consent is uncertain or unreliable , the Secretary
General must insist that the peac e keeping operations include appropriate
war-fight ers under natio nal command who are authorized by the Security
Council to engage in th e affirmative use of armed force . If host nation c onsent
is withdrawn, the UN Blue Helmets must leave the sovereign territory of the

Stat e where they are no longer wel come.
A fo urth requirement is that peacekeep ers must have the means to implement

the respective mandates they are given. UN forces must no t b e seen as "paper
tigers. " The institutional effect iveness of the United Nations to promote peace
in the long term is seriously harmed when Blue Helmets are assigned missions
they canno t actually perform. The Secur ity Council ough t to include Green
Helmets in its mandat es where enforc ement activities may arise. If the S ecre 
tary- General does n o t have the perso nnel, e quipment , and other sup port
necessary t o fulflll the Security Council mandate, he must refuse to accep t the
p eacekeeping mission. The Secretary-General has a solemn duty not to accept
"missio n imp ossible " mandat es; he must insist upon an achievable mission,
adequate reso urces and, if necessary, back-up forces supplied by Member States
that are prepared for offensive milit ary operations. Part of this po int is that the
Unite d States and the o ther nations who are in the same c ategory must pay
their UN bills on time. Memb ers in serious financial arrear s o ught to be
restrained about requesting additio n al UN p e acekeeping services . However, the
essent ial concept is that the United Nations, as an institut ion, must be genuinely
prepared n o t only with the polit ical will to "stay the course" but also with the
financial resourc es to ensure that the required military personnel and e quipment
will be available to fulfill the mandat e. The United Nations and Member States

such as the Unit e d States must not take on peacekeep ing missions when the
resources needed to achieve the mandate are in doubt. Concisely expressed, it

is bett er no t to go at all than to go and do badly. A related no tion is that the

United N at io ns simply cannot do all it wants to do any more than a national
government can .
A fifth requirement for a multin ational peacekeep ing o peration destined for
a mixed settin g is clear command and control over the respective gro ups
deployed. The relationships be tween the White, Blue, and Green Helmets will
be illustrated in the next section. To begin , written do cuments that provide fo r
close coordination between thos e in charge of the humanitarian , traditional
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peacekeeping and e nforcement personnel must be in place in advance o f
deployment. O n e
of all natio nal

UN co mmander wearing a Blue H elmet must be in char ge

military co ntingents dedi cate d to

a p articular traditional

peacekeeping operation . An agreed upo n representative in the theater of
operatio ns fo r all o f the n o n governmental organizations involved in humani
tarian assistance must b e asked to sign o n to the

UN plan . If a White Helmet

group is unwilling to sign such an agreement, the United Natio ns and its
Member States sho uld deny it any support whatso ever. Green H elmets , such as
the regular military units in Nato , will undoubt edly have a single military officer
co mmander who is empowered to act as commander fo r the c o mbatants. The
point is that authority, responsib ility, and accountability fo r each helme t color
must be cl early established at the o utset of any
involving the us e of force.
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IV
Seve ral M ixed Peacekee p i ng Sce n a rios

U

N PEACEKEEP I N G PRACT I CE has evolve d over m an y years without

articul ation of a consistent and well -thought-out doctrine on the all -im

portant issu e of the use of fo rc e. Sin c e peacekeeping op erations were launched
as practi cal resp on ses by th e Un ite d Nations to m eet urgen t demand s that the
organization play a constructive rol e in defusing inter natio nal c onflicts , the
practice fo r mul tinatio nal o p e rations under UN ausp ices developed case by case .
A central thesis in this study is that , with clar ifications, the framework in the
UN

Charter provi des an acc eptable an d wo rkable b asis fo r mul tinati onal

peacekeeping op eration s. The p o int o fview is that deficiencies in UN perfo rm
ance are n o t due to a fundamentally flawed Charter but rather are due to a
misapplication of pr inciples impl icit in it. Th e most commo n error with respect
to issuing peacekeeping mandates has b ee n the failure o f the S ecur ity Council
to dis tinguish clearly b etween cons ensual and c o ercive activities. Fro m a legal
poin t of view, the Charter is founded on consent from sovereign States. And
co nsent is a crucial le gal pr incipl e in its own right in all legal systems. In the
cr iminal law, for instanc e , the absence o f co nsent can be the difference between
lawful assisted su icide and unlawful murder. As a practical matter, the Security
Co uncil ough t to pursue a mo re rati onal and co nsistent ap pro ach fo r p e acekeep
ing activities within the existing framework, since amendment of the Charter is
not only not imminent but also unnecessary. S everal hypo thetical scenario s
foll ow that ar e intended t o illustrate h o w peacekeeping p ractice migh t b e
conducted to c o mp or t better with t h e U N Charter a s it i s wr itten. Part o f the
assumptio ns in the scenar ios is th at p e acekeep ing operations o ccur in a mixed
setting between peace and war an d that Nato 's military c apacity has been
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expanded in some way to include Russia and other former Soviet Unio n
natio ns.
Traditio nal peacekeeping o perations are frequently referred to as "Blue
Helmet " operations, bec ause peacekeep ers normally wear a blue c overing on
their heads to identify their affiliation with the Unite d Nat io ns. The operational
co mman der of Blue Helmet forces is a regular military officer of a Member
State who is temp o rar ily detailed to service under the UN Se cretary-General .

The Clinton administration's policy on "Reformin g Multilateral Peace Op era
tions," issued in May 1 9 94, places lead management and funding responsibility

for u. s. partic
Department. 1

�ation in Blue H elme t operations in the hands o f the U. S . S tate

This policy de cisio n is co nsistent with the view advanced in th is

study that UN forces sh ould be strictly co nfined to consensual o peratio ns.

Moreover, the author's view is that U.S. ground troops o ught no t to be deployed
as peacekeepers wearing B lue Helmets . Prior to the breakup of the S oviet
Union, none of th e Permanent M embers of th e Security Co uncil served as
traditional peacekeepers. This practice has many advantages , not the least o f
wh ich i s the strong desire i n the U. S. Congress that Amer ican forc es no t serve
un der foreign commanders save for an unexpan ded Nato .
The ch aract erization " Green Helmets" is used in the scenario s that follow
to refer to the conventional air, ground, and sea military forces that are
maintain ed by most Member nations. The color green

was

selected because that

is the typical colo r of the helmet worn by ground c o mbat tro ops. " Green
H elmet" is simply a sho rthand fIgure of speech selected to den o te th e co nve n 
tional military combatant forces o f Member States whose actions are governed
by the cust omary laws of arme d c onflict . The premise in this study is that Green
Helmets are presumptively combat forces who do not perform traditional
p eacekeeping tasks . The traditio n al peacekeeping role would be played by Blue

Helme t s who serve con currently in the same "mixed" consensual and c oercive

co nflict area with Green H elmets. In the UN peacekeeping c ontext advan ced

in this study, Gre en H elme t fo rces participating in a mixed multinational
peacekeeping operation would report directly t o the professional military
officers in their chain of command. The Green Helmets would not report to a

UN co mmander. Green H elmet co mmanders woul d be natio nals of a Member
State that is either part of a Unified Command operation mandated by the

Security Council un der Chapter VI I or a regional o rganization functioning in

a c ollective secur ity capacity, e.g. , OS eE/ Nat o revise d un der Chapter VIII. The
Unifie d Command or regional organization would est ablish its respective chain
of command as directed by the contributing nations.
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The main idea is that for enforcement actions that would be conducted only
by Green Helmets, a single chain of command would be set up by the natio ns
themselves. This chain would be clearly designated on an agreed upon basis
with policy guidance set at political level s, e.g. , North Atlantic Council or o s eE .
Formal reports from the military command in the theater of operation would
flow through the designated chain of command for interface with the United
Nations elements first at political levels. One or more accredited representatives
from major co ntributing nations to a mixed operatio n wo uld report directly to
the Security Council on the Green Helmet enforcement activities. As the
mandate to enforce comes from the UN Charter, the contributing Members
would have neither more nor less authority than that which the Security
Council rightfully bestowed for the particular enforcement operations. To
repeat, Green Helmets would not report formally t o the Secretary-General or
to any of his appointed military commanders. By contrast, the Secretary-General
would continue to report to the Secur ity Council on all Blue Helmet
peacekeeping activities as he has tradit ionally do ne. A clear, political chain o f
command is absolut ely necessary t o facilitate compl ete co operation between
Blue and Green Helmet military commanders in the area of potential hostilities.
Likewise, th ere must be extensive co ordination between Green and Blue units
at the operational level in a mixed "war-peace" s.etting. The working assumption
must be that there is agreement on the mission mandate and the respective roles
to be played by the Blue and the Green Helmets. In the United States, the
Defense Department has the lead responsibility for oversight, management, and
16
financial support of all U. S. participation in Green Helmet operations. Again,
this policy decision by the Clinton administration is consistent with the legal
theory that Green Helmets are combatants who ought to be led by experienced
military professionals.
The term "White Helmets, " as used in this study, refers to an eclectic
assortment of civilians or other noncombatant groups who may be affiliated
with UN peacekeeping operations in a mixed setting. The United Nations itself
has numerous specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization, that
are often heavily engaged in humanitarian activities in combat zones. These
organizations often work side-by-side in the field with nongovernmental enti
ties, e.g., the International Committee of the Red Cross. Customary law of war
principles confer a protected status o n civilians, including media perso nnel ,
civilian co ntractors, and other noncombatants indirectly associated with combat
operations. Civilians who refrain from war-like activities are legally entitled to
protected-person treatment that is consistent with their non-warlike activities.
White Helmets will almost always be civilians, but could be military medical
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doctors o r nurses , fo r instance , providing human itar i an assistance. W hen Blue
or Gree n H elmets are temporar ily tasked to directly suppo r t humanitarian
activities , temporary rul es pertaining to their status for the pur p o ses of the
p articular missio n should apply, as discussed below.
Keeping in mind three categories-no ncombatants, neutrals, and c o mbatants
that generally corresp o n d to White, Blue, and Gree n H elmets-imagine th e
following sce nar io. A Europ ean Member of the Unite d Natio ns has been
subjected to protracted civil strife with rival ethnic groups pitted against one
ano ther. The armed conflict so metimes spills over to neighb oring countries.

Th e UN Secretary-General, with the support o f several European regional
organizations, brokers an uneasy truce . The contending fo rce s , including the
legally reco gnized represen tatives of the host State that is a Member of the

United Natio ns, sign a p e ace ac cord. Th e accord, in ter alia, invite s UN p eacekeep 

ers into that country's sovereign territory t o help with a de ter io rating human i

tarian situatio n and to enforce the p eace settlement as provide d in the accord.

The Secur ity Council passes a resolutio n o n the situation with three distinct
mandate s. The fir st is that the Secretary- General is urged to facilitate human i
tar ian assis tance efforts and to support those who are engage d in UN-ap proved
relief ac tivitie s . The second is that the Secretary-General is asked to prepare a
Blue Helmet o p eratio n fo r th e h o st n atio n that will be funded through the
General Assembly. The Blue H elmets' missio n includes p roviding civilian
policemen to assist in re-establishing do mestic law an d order and military
observers to monito r neutral zo ne s d esignated in the peace acc ord to separate
the warring factions. As traditio nal p eacekeepers, the Blue Helmets are lightly
armed and are autho rized to use deadly force o nly as a last resort for p erso nal
or UI1lt self-defense. The third portion of the Security Co uncil mandate accep ts

an offer from a Europ ean regional organization to lead and to fund a Unified
Coalition o f M ember States who will provide the Green Helmets fo r th e
operat ion in this mixed " war-peace" setting. The missio n of the Green Helmets ,
who will be drawn from a Nat o plus o th e r natio ns coalition , is to enforce the
peace accord that was signed by war r ing faction leaders. The Green Helmets
may al so respond to requests from the Blue H elmet c ommander to employ
l evels of force beyo n d the Blue H elmet's c ap abilities .
Assume further that White, Blue, and Green H elmets ar e n ow o n the ground
in the host State 's terr itory as mandated by Security Council r esolutions. Prior
to the in-country deployment of either the Blue or Green Helmets, several
agreements were execute d . An aid e memo ire b etween the UN Secretariat an d
t h e tro op-co ntributing countries laid o u t t h e guidelines for assigning p ersonnel
and equipment for Blue Helmet service . None of the Blue Helmets are fro m
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a nation with permanent membership o n the Se cur ity Co uncil. A status of
forces agreement (SOFA) b e tween the United Nations and the host natio n
representatives is reache d that defmes the le gal relatio nsh ips b e tween the B lue
Helmets and th e host nation. In this case, a model S OFA on file with the
Secretary- General had been incorpo rated by referenc e in the Peace Accord an d
declared provisio nally applicable. It is stipulated that the Peace Accord was
properly exe cuted by approp riate po litical represen tatives in the host nation,
including the government rec o gnized by the States involve d. The Peace Accord
provides that Blue Helmet pe rsonnel will be entitled to the pr ivileges an d
immunities accorded " experts o n missio n , " i . e . , the status enjoyed by UN agents
while en gaged in offic ial duties. S upplementary administrative and op erating
regulations tailored to this particular op eration will be issued as circumstances
require and time permits. The Blue and Green Helmet military c o mmanders
have j o in tly prepared and issued a combined strat egic o p erations plan that , inter

alia, spells out comp atible but clearly separate rules of en gagement geared to
their respective military roles. One important agreed up o n rule is that the Green
Helmets may only in itiate offensive operati ons against fo rces deemed ho stile to
the B lue Helmets when asked to do so by the Blue Helmet c o mmand. Once
engaged in hostilities initiated at the re quest o f the Blue H elmets , the Green
Helmets will disengage either wh en the requested mission is acc omplished,
co nsistent with the safety o f Green Helmets , or wh en the B lue Helmet
co mman d asks them to cease op erations. The Green H elmets have no obligation
to cease operations in a way that is inco nsistent with th eir customary law rights
of self-defense. In fact, an important pr inciple expressed in the combined
ope ratio ns plan is that neither Blue no r Green H elmet forces ever relinquish
th eir inherent right and duty of individual or unit self-defense . Lastly, a UN
advance team had co ncluded memoranda of under standing (MO Us) with the
Internatio nal Committee of the Red Cross and several o ther humanitarian
groups active in th e ho st nation. The se MOUs were directed primarily at
practical ways to maintain the distin ction betwe en the purely humanitarian
activities of the White Helme ts, the UN traditional p eacekeep ing operations of
th e Blue H elme ts , and the UN enforcement actions of the Gre en H elmets . The
MOUs also e stablish effective communicatio n netwo rks to ensure that there are
prac tical means for close consultatio n o n humanitarian activities b e tween the
Wh ite and Blue Helmets on the one hand and close coo rdination on operatio nal
use of fo rce matter s b etween th e Blue Helmets and the Green H elmets on the
other.
A conditi o n for UN support for the White Helmets is that they be present
in the area o f pot ential hostilities at the request of all co nten ding factions in the
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host nation . Th e White H elmet s are likely to become engaged in activities such
as in distr ibut ing foo d and providing medical assistanc e throughout the host
nation. In these activitie s , the White H elmets may be ass isted from time to time

by either Blue or Green H elmet military units. For example , the u. s. Ar my
Corps of Engineers units serving as Green Helmets may make available to the
White Helmets the personnel and material needed to build wat er purification

facilities. The u. s. Air Force may also provide C- 1 7 aircraft to ferry supplies
into th e host nation to support the White H elmet humanitarian assistance
efforts.
The White Helmets consist of numerous organ izations with various nationals
from around the world. In this scenario, the Blue H elme t fo rces are drawn from

the Netherlands , No rway, and Poland and are led by a D utch br igadier general .
The expan ded Nato-led Green H elmet co mbatants are drawn from seven
co ntributing natio ns, includin g Russia and the United State s. The co mmander
in the host natio n of these expan ded Nato -led forces is a national of France; his
deputy is

a

national of Russia. Th e Green H elmet air units are under the

comb ined command of a United States Air Force officer.
What is the status of the respective individuals participating in this mixed

UN peacekeepin g o peration ? What rule s govern th eir use or nonuse of force ?

The White H elme t civil ians are noncomb atants who are ent itled to the
protections afforded in the Fourth 1 949 Geneva Convention Relat ive to the
Protection of Civili an Persons in Time of War. Th e White H elmets are not
obligat ed to wear a uniform, but it is des irable that they take c are to distinguish
themselves from indigenous factions who may be lawful hostile fire targets. The
White H elmets should, in pr inciple, not carry ar ms or en gage directly i n
co mbatant activities. Their legal right to carry ar ms is the same as that of an
ordinary citizen in the host nation who might car ry small arms strictly for
personal self-defense. To avoi d j eopardizing their protected per son status under
inter natio nal law, they should c onfm e their activitie s to humanitarian work and
not will ingly become direc tly engaged in hostilities. Legally, the Wh ite H elmets
are not to be captured or treated as combatants. Killing them deliberately is the
crime of murder under the laws of the host nation and may be a grave breach

of the laws of war under internatio nal law.

The Blue Helmet troops that assist the White H elmets incur n o change in
legal status by ren der ing humanitarian assistance. They wear uniforms and c arry

small arms openly. The main duty of all UN Blue Helmet peac ekeepers is to

help all humanity in an impartial manner. Therefore, it is important that the
Blue Helmets make every effort to treat all host nation groups impartially. After
all , the Blue Helmets are represen t atives of the United N ations as a whole. The
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UN Blue Helmet troops' arms are appropr iate for the p o lic e-like functions and
rel ated neu tral duties they un dertake to perform with the prior c o nsent of th e
host natio n . Likewise , the

SOFA rules conferring privile ges and immun iti e s for

UN "experts on mission" apply to the Blue Helmets. Blue H e lmets are not t o
be c aptured b y ho stile forces o r treated a s prison ers of war. I f detain ed o r taken
into custody by ho stile forces, they are entitled to imme diate release.
Gre en Helmet forces, such as military engineers or cargo aircraft crews
directly assisting White Helme ts, also ought to h ave the same neutral st atus as
Blue Helmet forces have, so long as these Green H elme ts are directly en gaged
sol ely in humanitarian activitie s. To be legally entitled to the privileges and
immunities granted to Blue Helmets, however, the Green Helmets must assume
the burdens that go with the b enefits of that status. The

SOFA must expressly

co nfer Blue Helmet neutral st atus on Gre en Helmets while they are un der
orders to directly support humanitarian activities. During that tim e , the Green
Helmets should wear distinc tive insignia on their helmets and unifo rms to
identify their temporary Blue Helmet status. If they comply, but are, never theless ,
captured, they are legally entitl ed to " expert on mission " status and are not to
be treated as priso ners of war. Consistent with their status as neutrals, the arms
that Green Helmet forces may c arry while rend ering dire ct assistance to White
Helmets must be comparable to what the Blue Helmets would car ry insofar as
practicable. To remain en titled to Blue Helmet status , the Green Helmet 's
vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and other e quipment shoul d be clearly marked to
indicate that they are temporarily engaged in noncombatant activities. Absent
clear indicatio ns to th e contrary, Green Helmets will be co rrec tly presumed by
ho stile forces to be c ombat ants. Th ere is, of course, no o bligation on th e part
of Gre en H elmets to claim the status ofBlue Helmets. Th ey may elect to remain
as combatants even while helping the White H elmets. In such a case, th ere is
no issue ab out the extent of the military hardware carried. But, as such, th ey
remain combatants and are prisoners of war if captured by h o stile forces. White
Helmets, however, may prefer that Green H elmet forces actually claim the status
of (and wear the insignia of) Blue H elme ts during humanitarian assistance
activiti es, since Green Helmets may draw fire as le gitimate targets by ho stile
fo rces even tho ugh directly engage d in humanitarian activities. The most
important law of

war

principle to b e ar in min d throu ghout all the above

circumstances is th at the reason to maintain a clear distinc tion b etween
comb atants, neutrals and n oncombatants is to protect noncomb atants from
ho stile use of force.
Next, assume that a White Helmet motor transport co nvoy carrying fo od
and medic ine under the direction of a me dical doctor from the UN World
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Health Organization is en rou te to a geographic center from which human i
tarian supplies are distributed t o anyo ne in need. H owever, the center is lo cated
in a region of the host nation that is predo minately inhabited by one of the
warring ethnic groups. As a practical matter, this me ans that almost all of the
humanitar ian assistance activitie s at the center inure to the benefit of one
partic ular ethnic group. The convoy is stopped by a rogue band made up of
paramilitary forces from another ethnic group that is embit tered by what they
co nsider to be the human rights violations c ommitted by individuals who are
of the same ethnic group as th e inhabitants near the distribution center.
Providing supplies to the distribution cen ter is seen by the rogues as a belligerent
act that dire ctly aids their enemies . The convoy i s pro tected by Blue Helmets
under the command of a Norwegian major, who rides at the front of the convoy
in his white radio jeep that is prominently flying a

UN flag. The drivers and the

trucks transporting the supplie s are from a Green Helmet unit on tempo rary
detail from a Turkish military detachment. As authorized in the

SO FA for this

type of situation , the Turkish troops wear blue plastic covers stretched over their
gre en helmets and have plastic

UN banners clearly displayed on their vehicles.

The le ader of the rogue band that surrounds the convoy demands that all the
cargo and supplies be relin quished to his forces .
For dealing with potential ho stilities, it was agreed by

MOU in advance that

the UN 's N orwe gian Blue Helmet officer would assume command an d co ntrol
of the humanitarian convoy operatio n . The United Nations is re sp onsible for
the safe passage of the White Helmets and for their shipment of humanitarian
sup plies. We may assume that the Turkish troops, who are openly assisting the
White Helmets, have c omplied with th e legal requireme nts detailed in the
and

SOFA

MOUs. Ac cordingly, they are temp orarily entitled to Blue Helme t non

combatant status while p erforming this humanitarian assistance role. Of course ,
th e Turkish fo rc es must continue to act like Blue Helmets to be entitle d to be
treated like Blue Helmets.
This situation illustrates why it is ab solutely es sential that Gre en Helmet
troops, who are highly trained for immediate reaction in combat situations,
cl early un derstand their status and th e applic able rules of engagement prior to
the time that hostile inc idents arise. Assume in this c ase that the Norwegian
major has an opportunity to negotiate with the leader of the rogue band. In
addition to explaining carefully th e noncombatant or neutral status of all the
individuals fo r whom he is respon sible, the maj or points out that he is in radio
communic ation with Green Helmets whose F- 1 6 tactical support aircraft are
circling overh ead. He also informs the ro gue commander that the route was
planned in advance and, therefore , has pre-plotted targets. Part of the c ontin -
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gency planning for t h e c o nvoy operation was that th e Gre en Helmets pro 
grammed naval gunfire and heavy artillery on likely ambush sites suc h as this.
While the rogue band firepower may be superior to that of the Blue Helmet
protection force , the Green H elmets are o n stand-by to render rapid strike

assist ance if requested. The major explains that , unlike the Blue Helmets , the
Green Helmets are ready and willing to engage, consistent with the laws of
armed conflict, in all-out warfare against the rogue band.
In the above sc enario, the Blue Helme t major may or may no t talk his way
out of hostilities with the rogue band. But certainly his chances of avoiding
conflict seem better by having ready recourse to th e Green Helm et's war-mak

ing capability. If hostil ities ensue , in spite of the UN officer's effortS to avoid

them, the Green Helmets are militar ily e quipped to enforce the UN mandate
by deadly use of force actions. This c apab ility should help maintain respect for
the overall UN peacekeeping efforts . Moreover, the hands of the B lue Helmet
are kept morally " cleaner" than if the maj o r were threatening to use force with
his own Blue H elmets. Future contacts b etween th e rogu e 's ethnic all ies and
the Blue Helmets should no t b e as c onfrontatio nal as woul d be the c ase if the
Blue Helmets were force d into either backing down or themselves en gaging in
direct armed conflict. At the same time, the Green Helmets are, righ tly, more
interested in rogue fe ar than friendship. The Green Helmet mind-set and mission
remain cl e ar. If calle d into combat, th ey are no t c o nfused ab out th e ir man date :
their missio n is to fin d and destroy the enemy.
Assume another scenario. The Blue Helm ets' missi o n is to provide security
for a UN - de signated "safe haven" where refugees may gather away from arm e d
ho stilities to rece ive medical care , fo od, a n d relat e d hum anitar ian assistance . At
an earlier stage in the strife , th e principal leaders of the c o ntending forces agreed
to th e establishment of this safe haven site. However, the Blue H elmet com
mander now has reliable intelligence that armed force s comp osed of o ne ethnic
group turned "rogue " are planning to launch an attack on the safe haven . T h e
camp is fil l e d with refugees from

an

ethnic group who a r e mortal enemies of

the armed fo rces expected to attack. In better times, UN political leaders had
widely bro adcast that the safe haven woul d b e a san ctuary under UN protectio n
for all refugee s who fled there. The Blue Helmet commander lacks the troops
and weapons to repel the att ack. What can he do ?
Assume that the po litical will exists in the S ecuri ty Council and on the part
of the S ecretary-Gen eral to protect the refugee safe haven an d that the Green
Helmets have received an appropriate urgent authorization to provide " all
necessary means" of ass istan c e to the Blue H elmet commander. The Dutch Blue
Helmet commander makes direc t contact with the French Gre e n H elmet
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c o mman der to request military assistance from the Gre en Helmets to defend
the safe haven refu ge e site. At th e st age when "all necessary means" use o f force
assistance is requested from the Green H elme ts, the Blue Helmets are obligated
by MOUs t o provide all their available intelligence about h o stile forc es and the
military situation per taining to the camp.
The Blue H elmet co mmander may tell the Gre en Helmet c o mmander what
the military force assistan c e mission is, but n o t how the Green Helmets are to
acc omplish it. Main tenance of a viable symbiotic relationship between the Blue
and Green Helmets in mixed "war-p eac e " settings is dependent upon cl ose and
co ntinuous co ordination between the two forces. But the Green H elmet
commander is under no obligation to risk his troops on missio n requests
encumbered with unacceptable ter ms and conditions imp o sed by the B lue
Helmet commander. Likewise, the Blue H elmet commander should no t request
assistance ifhe judges that the rogue group 's likely reaction t o the Green H elmet
intervention outweighs the benefit of requesting combatant assistance. The
nature of the agreed relationship is that the Blue Helmet commander requests
the missio n and the Green Helmet commander may accep t it or rej e c t it . I f h e
accepts i t , t h e Green Helmet commander executes it a s he s e e s fi t until the
missio n is over. The point is th at military necessity dictates that the ultimate
sel ection of the means to ac complish a co mbatant mission is dec ided by the
Green H elmet commander.
Assume in this case that the mission por trayed by the Blue H elmet com
mander is for the Green Helmets to protect th e safe haven refugee c amp from
an anticipated attack by a rogue ethnic band. This missi o n assign ment is accep ted
by the Green Helmet commander.
The Green H elmet co mmander tasks a reinforced battalion of U. S. Mar in e s
located o n a n offshore assault ship t o undertake a n urgent, initial deployment
to commence accomplishment of the missio n. Assume that this unit is forward
deployed expressly to suppo rt UN operations as part of a Nato amphibious task
force that is on station in the Mediter ranean Sea. Within a few hours of rec e iving
th e missio n request, co ntingent o perations plans are appropr iat ely adapted, and
the Marines are helicoptered t o the safe haven site area in the host nation . With in
ano ther few hours , the Mar ine s establish an outer defensive p er imeter around
the Blue Helmet's inner se curity ring around the refugee c amp. Additional
e quipment and personnel co ntinue to arr ive, including a British psychological
operat ions unit th at erects a large radio broadcast tower. This unit will concen
trate o n info r min g the po pulace in the host nation of the reasons for the
UN -sponsored military activities that are being undertaken with the consent of
the le gitimate government. Six pieces of Russian h eavy artillery are brought in
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by U. S . Air Force C-1 7 airc raft which are able to l an d on the makeshift former
,

commercial landi ng strip now secured wi thin the Marines' defen sive per imeter

.

The Ru s sian combat troops are under the command of a Russian ar tillery
cap tain who reports through the single Green Helmet chain of command fo r

all expanded Nato fo rces engaged in enforcement action in the host n ation.
Prior to deployment , Russian po liti cal representatives h ad agree d t o the

co ntribution of the Russian troo ps an d equipment fo r this operation. U. S. N avy
and Marine cl ose air support aircraft have been flying overhead sin c e accom

panying the init ial helico pter assaul t forces into the combat area. I n sh o rt , all of
the usual warfighting activities neces sary for a succe ssful military o p e rat ion are

put into motion by th e mili tary professio nals in the expanded Nato. One unusual

co mmand and c o n trol aspect is that th e French Green Helmet commander, in
addition to his deputy from Russia, has at least one senior officer on his p ersonal

staff either from each of th e nation s contributin g forces or their designated
proxy. These officers are emp owered to mak e recomme ndati ons, at any stage,
to their respective national military commands regarding the co nduct of the
comb at operati ons being co nduct e d by exp anded Nato forces. Such rec o m 
,

mendations c o u l d include termination of that nati on s voluntary suppo rt o f any
'

UN

enforcement action, including this one, which is to pro t ect the safe h aven

refugee camp. Part of th e advance agreement b etween the con t r ibut in g Member

States is that such withdrawal will not be i m pl emented in a way that unduly

jeo pardi zes the l ives of other Nato fo rc es continuing in the engagement .

The Green Helmets will pr ov id e protection for the safe haven unt il aske d to

l e ave by the Blue Helmet commander o r by the lawful government o f the host
natio n. The Green Helmets wo uld of course also leave when ordered to do so

by the Green H elmet op erational co mman d er.

The Blue Helmet co mmander may decide th at it i s too risky to ask for Green

Helmet assistance, an d the Blue Helmets are under n o obligation t o request
assistanc e . But it should b e obvious that the Blue Helmets canno t accompl ish
their missio n as mandated by the Security Council without the genuine

cooperation ofthe armed factions in the h ost n ation. Wh en fac ed with h o stilities,
the Blue Helmets retain the discretion to decide whether to stay in co mm and
and contro l They may not want to p ass operatio nal co mman d an d control to
the Green Helmets. But once passed, forces hostile to the UN troo ps must
under stand that wh en the Green Helmets dec ide t o use a p arti cular type o r
amount o f ar m e d fo rce agai n st a n enemy. th at i s a matter b e tween the Green
.

Helmets and the enemy. The Blue Helmets are out of the decisi o n lo op. Even
without a Blue Helme t request , the Green Helmets are under no obligation to

stand by h elpl essly and watch a sl augh te r of civilians or o ther inno cents.
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including Blue Helmets. Green Helmet political lead ers may decide on their
own to take hostile actio n against ro gues, or any other enemy. But such use of
force in the pe acekeeping area of operations must be lawful either under the
UN Charter, pursuant to S ecurity Council mandate, or by agreement with the

host State. To keep the ir status as a legitimate enforcement agent for the S ecurity
Council, for example , the Green Helmets would be required to act within the
legal parameters of the resolutions authorizing their involvement. If th e UN
mandate were too restrictive, the political leaders controlling an exp anded
Nato 's military forces should refuse to take the mission. They sh ould also refuse
missions where the mandate from the S e curity Council is ambiguous.
In the above scenarios, the Blue and Green H elme ts' use of armed fo rce is
consist ent with the UN Charte r as well as with accepted conventional and
customary international law. The troops know their status-if in doubt, they
can check the color of their helme ts. Blue Helmets are not neutrals one moment

and combatants the next. Likewise, Green H elmets are combatants unless they
carefully comply with previously agreed up on ar rangements negotiated with
the host nation whereby they may temporarily enj oy "expert on mission" status.
Equally important, all others, including potential hostile fo rces, should be able
to readily identify the status of individuals and their equipmen t. If rogue fo rces
kill a White o r Blue Helmet, this is the domestic crime of murder with o nly
the defenses and mitigatio n permitted under the judicial system of th e host
nation. The ac t may also be a war crime within the jurisdictio nal competence
of an international cr iminal co urt. If rogue fo rces kill a Green Helmet in comb at ,
it is no t murder anymore than it is murder if one of the rogue forces is kill e d
by the Green Helmets. Both are full-fledged combatants whose conduct is
governed by the laws of armed conflict. The principle is that establishing a clear
status fo r different catego ries of troops in mixed hostilities is indispensable
consider ing the l e gal c o nsequences that follow from that status.
From the po int o fview ofcommand and control, Blue Helmets are ultimately
responsible to the Secretary-General who, in turn, on traditional peacekeeping
missions, reports to the Secur ity Council. The S ecretary-General is also ac
co untable to the General Assembly, wh o must pay the bills fo r the peacekeeping
operations he supervises. By contrast , the Green Helmet chain of command
flows through a Unified or Coalition commander, probably designated by Nato,
perhaps un der a regional organization such as the

OSCE.

The

O S CE

qualifies

as a regional collective secur ity organization that is entitled, under Art icle 5 3
i n Chapter VII I of the U N Charter, to assist the Security Council in carrying
out Chapter VII enforcement actions. Nato does not presen tly so qualify, but

the North Atlantic Treaty could be re-negotiated to allow this legal possib ility.
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An interesting var iation is that N ato could serve as one entity contributing

forces to a newly created Chapter VI I I collective se curity arrangement for the
No rth Atlant ic regio n . The o ther contributing entitie s c o ul d be expanded Nato

member States particip ating in their individual , as distinguished from their
co ll ective , capacity. Fro m a do mestic perspective, this wo uld entail obtaining
the advice and co nsent of the United States Senate . To elaborat e : it is no t
unlawful from the perspective of international law for N ato to be used as a
Chapter VI I I regional enforcement o rganizati on so lo ng as the ac tivities are

approved by the Nato heads of State or their agents. At the same time , it is not
lawful under the domestic Constitutional pro c ess es in the United States to use

Nato as a Chapter VI I I co lle ctive security organization witho ut obtaining the
advice and consent of the U. S. Senat e . As is evident fro m the text of its Article

5, the Senate only approved the No rth Atlantic Treaty as an Article 5 1 , Chapter

VI I self-defense organization.

The legal rules governing peacekeeping operat ions in mixed "war-peace "
settings are not e asy to unravel , b ut they can be sorte d out with cle ar thinking
and mental discipline on the part of political leaders. The S ecretary-General
can serve as an even-handed representative of all sovereign Me mbers, and
traditional p eacekeeping that has b e en successful when done properly can
co ntinue un der the UN Chart er as written . There is little that is unusual ab o ut
the comb ine d-color Helme t op erations described in this study except the
no tion that the Blue H elmet commander has the author ity to withdraw his
request for Green Helmet assistance on missions undertaken at Blue H elmet
requ est.
As no ted e arlier, in the United State s, th e Departmen t o f D efe nse , pursuant
to the May 1 9 9 4 presidential decisio n , has le ad management and funding
responsibility for U. S. participation in Green H elmet operations, whether they
o c cur under traditional peacekeeping or enforcement action mandat es from the
Secur ity Council. Significantly, the approach suggested in this study does n o t
co ntemplate U N funding for Green H elmets, who s e ac tions are focused almost
exclusively on enforcement. The costs of Green Helmets are to b e paid by the
contributing Members who must also pay their UN-determined share to other
nati ons who provide tro ops for traditional UN peaceke ep ing Bl ue H elmet
op erations. It is exp ected that the approach o utl in e d in this study will discourage
the United Nati ons from overreaching into risky and expensive ventures with
traditional peacekeepers, as the policy of the S ecur ity Council will b e to leave
enforcement to M e mber State forces who do not repo rt to the Security Council
thro ugh the Se cretary- G eneral .
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On e downside to this approach is that the Unite d S caces and o cher States
with the ability to influence Security Council mandates paid by the United
Nations would have to pay for the enfo rcement actions they support out of
their national budge ts. In addition , th e lives laid on the line for UN enforcement
operations would be those of nationals from the Member S tates whose military
services would be do ing the enforcing. The perceived advantage of c o st-sharing
for enforcement operations from Germany, japan, and other UN Members in
general would be lost. Still , the net effect of the approach is that the United
Nations as such would be kept away from en forcement op erations it cannot
afford and should not be involved in anyway. An additional result under this
approach is th at the United States and o ther nations contributing Green
Helmets would be discouraged from entering into enforcement operatio ns.
Certainly, th e U. S. Congress wo uld h ave more input into Green Helmet
decisions than it d o es n ow when there is confusio n about whether the
comm.itment is for a Blue or Green Helmet operation. From the perspe ctive
of the United States, any Administration is less likely to commit U.S. military
forces to Green Helmet op erations without consultation with Congress. The
mere fact that such consultation will o ccur is likely to act as a brake on the
comm.itmen t of forces overseas.
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Reforming Secu rity Council Peace kee ping Mandates

�HE SECURITY C OUNCIL SHOULD return to the basic principles in th e
Jl UN Charter an d apply its provisio ns regarding use of fo rce clearly an d
co nsistently with resp ect to all peacekeep ing operations. I n doctr ine an d
applicatio n , pe rsonnel sho uld have no c o nfusi o n about the ir roles: White
Helmets are unarme d noncombatants; Blue H elmets are lightly ar med neutrals;
and Green Helmets are fully armed c o mb atants. Civil ians may command White
Helmets; th e Secretary- General's military commander may command B lue
Helmets; and a UN-approved Member-State co alitio n or regional colle ctive
sec ur ity organizatio n 's military commander may command Green Helmets.
The structure of the UN Charte r provide s fo r a gradual escalation from
low-key preventive dipl omacy by th e Secretary-General to full-sc ale offen sive
military action (when auth orize d by the Security Co uncil) by Member S t ates
to maintain international peac e an d se cur ity. The Secur ity Council is o bligated
to exhaust Chapter VI me asures b efore invokin g " Chapter VI an d a half'
traditio nal peacekeeping ac tions. Chap t er VI I enforcement measures are to be
led by collec tive security alliances consisting of Member S tates, n o t by the
S e cretary- General . Th e No rth Atlantic Treaty needs to be ren e go tiated before
Nato is legally empowered under U. S. law to act o ther than as an Article 5 1
self-defense fo rce in the current p artie s ' terr itories. I n any eve n t, the role o f th e
Secre tary-Ge neral is consisten t with the UN Charte r wh en limit e d to traditio nal
peacekeeping. The Secur ity Co uncil has a responsibility to provide sufficiently
clear guidance so that agreed up on rul es of en gagement detail the exact
circumstances under which military armed force is authorize d in all UN
operatio ns. The ne ed for co nsistent UN use of fo rc e doctr ine has never b e e n
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greater, given th e cur rent trend to lace together diverse c o alitions with both
p olice and co mbatant fun ctions that are expected to be performed in mixed
"war -pe ace " settin gs. Moreover, to cope with the greater number of regio nal
conflicts since the end of the Cold War, the United N ations is likely to make
greater use of Chapter VI I I regional peacekeepers. Truly combined multina
tional force s , with rapid re sponse capabilities, are emerging to meet that need
in the N ato context. Proper S ecur ity Council mandates should draw a br ight
line b etwe en UN command and control for traditional self-defens e peacekeep
ing an d national co mmand an d co ntrol for offensive enforcement actions.
Fifty years after its fo unding, the United Nations has re ache d ano ther
thresh old. UN cre dibility with respect to internati onal peace and secur ity is
being challenged at a time when the opportunity to fulftll the commitments in
th e UN Ch arter are the best since the end of World War II. Th ere is al so a
pressing need for greater selectivity in undertakin g UN peacekeeping missions.
The UN's financial cr isis is ser ious and will simply wo rsen wh en the United
States reduc es its sh are of funding to a more realistic 25 percent contr ibution.

A maj o r problem in peacekeeping is that b o th the S e cretary- General and the
Security Counc il must learn to "just say no. " Each must re strict itself to roles
and missions that are c onsistent with the legal requiremen ts in the UN Charter.
The United Nations must fac e its limitations realistic ally, and Member States,
part ic ularly the Unit ed States , must disc ipline themselves to see k only achievable
go als.
Promin ently, the UN Charter expressly prohibits intervention in the do mestic
affairs of sovereign States. The Clinton administrati on conceptually came to
grips with the problem ofwhen to support a p e acekeeping operation in its May
1 9 94 policy announ cement . After listing a collection of factors such as national
interest, threat to the peace, clear objectives and the like , the Administratio n
stat ed that it would apply even str icter standards for U. S. participation in what
amounted to an enforcement action o p eration, i. e . , r isking combat. This is sound
p ol icy, but it ne eds to be implemented in deeds as well as in words. The S e cur ity
Council canno t afford to take enforcement action in every nation where there
are si gnificant human r igh ts violations or a defective fo rm of demo cratic
government. In fact, these defects have always existed in a maj o r ity of the
Member S tates in the United Nations. The organization r ightfully lacks the
political will and the resourc es to deal with these matters on a co nsistent basis
throughout the globe.
The Se cur ity Council must institute a more selective review pro cess fo r b o th
the operational activities and financial aspects of its peaceke epin g man dates. Far
to o oft en th e Secur ity Counc il has too readily, almost automatically, extended

66

Wha t Color Helmet?
or expanded peacekeep ing mandates. The S e curity Council should terminate
peacekeeping missions outr ight when domestic fac tions lack the p o litical will
to live in peace witho ut UN pe acekeepers. The noti o n ought to be accepted
th at domestic armed co nflicts h ave a cycle that must b e

r un

until the hostile

forces want to stop fighting. Premature involvement by the United N ations m ay
yield short-ter m gains but is highly unlikely to be successful in the long run .

In some instances, the Uni te d Natio ns h as assumed virtually

a

pe rmanent

presenc e in host nations akin to that of an o c cupyin g power, even when
individual Members c an be easily iden tified as spo ns ors of one or an other
warr in g faction. Let the State spo nsors of the conflic t p ay fo r th e UN presence
or pull the pe acekeepers out. If ne c e ssary, the Se curity Council can utilize its
mandatory powers to impo se p oliti c al and financial accountability on individual
Members th at support threats to internatio nal p eace and security. While this
tough-minded approach may lead to the extraction of UN fo rces fro m places
such as Cyprus, it will also, for exampl e , place responsib ility for that c risis
squarely o n th e nations r espo nsible : Turkey and Gre e c e .

Th e Securi ty

Council

and Nato have the political and military means to deal with whatever may arise
as a result of closing down the UN o ccupation th e re. As it is, the world
community is fo o ting the b ill for a bilate ral problem which neither offending
state h as any incen tive to settle, and the problem j ust c ontinues to fester.
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UN

CHARTER I S FAR FROM PERFECT, b u t i t i s the most imp ortan t

agreement that t h e world h a s ever concluded to constrain aggressive war.

With the thaw in the Cold War, a fleeting window of opportunity has opened
to fo llow the Charter on se cur ity issues almo st as originally int ended fifty years
ago. Unfortunately, overreaching by the Secretary- General, lack of discipline by
political leader s in the United States and elsewhere, as well as o t her factors, have
caused the essential le gal distinction between co nsensual and c o ercive measures
to be blurred. The post -Cold War reality is that UN-sponsored forc es are likely
to be placed in mixed " war-peac e " settings involving eth nic strife where several
cat egories of peaceke ep ers must deal simultaneously with a spectrum of
activities ranging from humanitarian assistan ce to enforcement ac tion. The
auth or's vi ew is that Blue Helmets should always restrict themselves to tradi 
tional peac eke epin g and that conventional war-fighters from Member States
sho uld presumptively retain their status as full combatants. Only wh e n circum
stanc es in the fi el d re quire Green Helmets to serve in a supp ort capacity under
Blue Helmet command sho uld the Gre en H elme ts bec ome le gally entitled to
temporary st atus as UN "experts on mission . " The principal conclusion ad
vanced is that the all-important distinction laid out in the UN Charter between
self-defense and enforcement use of fo rce categories can, an d should, be
main tained. Finally, while the UN Charter suffi ces as written as a legal basis fo r
generic peac ekeeping activitie s (once prop erly distinguished) , the North Atlan
tic Treaty has clearly be en overtaken by post-Cold War events. A ne w No rth
American-European collective security sch eme should reconstitut e Nato t o
all ow i t to func tion , a s in t h e past , a s a n Article 5 1 self-defense o rganizatio n
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un der Chapter VII , but also as a contributor entity itself to a Chapter VII I
collective security agency mandated by t h e Secur ity Council.
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Polisario Front
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UNASOG
UNAVEM I
UNAVEM II
UNAVEM III
UNCRO

A tlantic Alliance's Rapid Response Corps
Commonwealth of Independent States
Council on the Co nference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (renamed OS CE)
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary- General on
the Dominican Republic
Economic Community of West Afr ican States Cease-fire
Monitoring Group
European Union
French-German WEU forces
French, Italian, Sp anish, and Portuguese WEU forces
All-Member Maritime Force (WEU)
Frente Farabundo Marti Para la Liberacion Nacional
Implementation Force
International Police Task Force
UN Mission for the Ver ification of Human Rights and of
Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Hu
man Rights in Guatemala
UN Missio n for the Referendum in Western Sahara
Memorandum of Understanding
North Atlantic Cooperation Coun cil
North Atlantic Co operation Council Ad Hoc Group
Organization o f African Unity
Operation des Nations Unies au Congo
UN Observer Group in Central America
UN Operation in Mo zambique
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (for
merly CS CE)
Party of Democratic Kampuchea
Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de
Rio de Oro
Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana
Rwandese Patriotic Front
Security Council Resolution
Stabilization Force (successor to IFOR)
UN Advanc e Mission in Cambodia
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UN Angola Verification Mission I
UN Angola Verification Mission II
UN Angola Verification Missio n III
UN Confidence Restoration Operation (in Croatia)
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UNDOF
UNEF I
UNEF I I
UN FICYP
UNGOMAP
UNI F I L
UNIIMOG
UNIKOM
UNIPOM
UNITA
UNITAF
UNMIBH
UNMIH
UNM O G I P
UNMOT
UN OGIL
UNOMIG
UN OMIL
UN OMSA
UNOMUR
UNOSOM I
UN OSOM I I
UN PA
UNPF

UN PREDEP
UNPRO FOR
UN TAC
UNTAE S
UN TAG
UN TEA/UNSF
UN TSO
UNYOM
URN G
WEU

UN Disengagement Observer Force
UN Emergency Force I (1 956-1 967)
UN Emergency Force I I (1 973- 1 979)
UN Peacekeepin g Force in Cyprus
UN Good Offices Missi o n in Afghanistan and Pakis tan
UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
U N India-Pakistan Observati on Mission
National Union for the To tal Independence of Angola
Unified Task Force
UN Miss ion in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UN M ission in Haiti
UN M ili tary Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UN Mission of Observers in Taj ikistan
UN Observation Gro up in Leb anon
U N Observer Mission in Ge orgia
UN Observer Mission in Liberia
U N Observer Missio n in South Afr ica
UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UN Operation in So malia 1 (1 992-1 993)
UN Operation in Somalia II (1 99 3- 1 995)
UN Pro t ected Area
UN Confidence Restoration Operations in Croatia (UN 
CRO) ; UN Preventive Deployment force (UNPRED EP)
within the former Yugo slav Republic of Mac edonia; an d
UNMIBH in B o snia and Herzegovina
UN Preventive Deployment Force
UN Pro tection Force
UN Transitional Authority in Camb odia
UN Transi tio n al A dministratio n fo r Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja, an d Western Sirmium
UN Transition Assistance Group
UN S e curity Force serving as a Temporary Executive
Authority (and security force)
UN Truce Supervisio n Organization
UN Yemen Observation Missio n
Uni dad Revolucionaria Naci onal Guatemalte ca
Western European Union
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